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Leased farmland, work done without a signed agreement: a farmer claims $300,000 and walks away empty-handed

William Desrochers — Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:06:16 +0000

He leases two lots for his crops. He proposes a 20-year lease with reimbursement of his investments; the owner replies with a counter-proposal. He says he will get back to them soon… and never does. During those negotiations, he invests, by his account, more than $150,000 in the land. In 2021, it is sold to another farm. The Superior Court dismisses his lawsuit. A costly lesson in the difference between negotiating and closing a deal.

The “agreement in principle” argument comes up often in commercial disputes. It reflects one party’s sincere belief that a deal had been struck, while the other considers that the parties were still in discussions. The judgment in Hammond c. Régie intermunicipale Argenteuil Deux-Montagnes (2026 QCCS 3176), delivered orally on June 10, 2026 by the Honourable David E. Roberge of the Superior Court (District of Terrebonne), and transcribed on August 24, 2026, is a reminder that Québec law requires more than an impression of agreement.

The facts: a one-year lease and negotiations that ran out of steam

The plaintiff is a farmer from the Lachute area who works the land with his family, notably through two companies. In May 2017, he personally signed a one-year lease on two farm lots with the Régie intermunicipale Argenteuil Deux-Montagnes, a public body responsible for waste management, for an annual rent of $15,000, renewable once. The lease was renewed in 2018.

In June 2019, the farmer proposed a 20-year lease at the same rent, with a right of first refusal in the event of a sale and reimbursement of his investments (drainage, levelling, soil preparation). In September 2019, the Régie accepted the principle of a 20-year lease and a right of first refusal, but made a counter-proposal: an indexed rent and reimbursement of improvements capped at $50,000 or prorated according to the years elapsed, whichever was lower. It stated that its lawyer would have to look into including a reimbursement clause in the event of a sale and that, “if” the proposal was acceptable, the agreement would then be drawn up. When followed up with in October 2019, the farmer replied that he was busy with the farming season and would get back to them soon. He never did. There was no communication on the subject until 2021.

The farmer continued to work the lots and pay the rent. In February 2021, the Régie decided to sell the land. He learned of it in February or March and submitted offers to purchase, first for about $900,000 through his children, then for $1,057,000, conditional on $157,000 being reimbursed to him. The Régie instead accepted the highest offer, from another farming business, at $1.4 million. Around April 20, 2021, it notified the farmer that the lease would end on April 30. He sued the Régie for more than $300,000: about $157,000 in investments, $106,440 in lost profits, $30,000 in rent paid “for nothing” and $10,000 for trouble and inconvenience.

Negotiating is not concluding

In Québec, a contract is formed by the mere exchange of consent, without any need for a written document (article 1385 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.)), unless the law requires a particular form. Still, an offer containing all the essential elements of the proposed contract must be accepted unequivocally (articles 1386 and 1388 C.C.Q.). A counter-proposal is not an acceptance: it is a new offer (article 1393 C.C.Q.).

Justice Roberge concludes that no agreement was ever reached. Two essential elements, the rent and the compensation for improvements, had never been agreed upon. The Régie’s last proposal, from September 2019, was awaiting a response that the farmer never gave. In cross-examination, he admitted that the agreement still had to be “completed” and that the i’s still had to be dotted. If he believed there was an agreement in principle, his belief amounted, at best, to an inexcusable error.

The judgment adds two further obstacles. First, a public body such as the Régie expresses its will through a resolution of its board; no resolution had ever approved a long-term lease. Second, the 2017 lease contained an entire agreement clause, stating that the written contract represented the whole of the agreement: statements by the Régie’s representatives could not amend it.

So what happened after April 2019? Even though the lease excluded tacit renewal, the parties kept acting as if the 2017 lease were still in force: the farmer occupied the lots and paid the rent, and the Régie cashed it. The judge finds an implicit renewal, from year to year, on the same terms, until April 30, 2021.

No fault on the Régie’s part

Good faith must govern the parties’ conduct at every stage of the contract (articles 6, 7 and 1375 C.C.Q.). But, the judge notes, insisting that a contract be respected is not bad faith. The lease ended on April 30, 2021 under its own terms, even if the formal notice came late; the farmer had in fact known for several weeks that the land would be sold, and the Régie’s chair had insisted that he be told quickly so as to avoid unnecessary seasonal costs.

Nor was the sale to a third party wrongful. Absent an agreement, the farmer had no right of first refusal. He was not shut out of the process: his offers were considered, then turned down because they were below the listing price and the best offer. The judge also rejects the unproven theory of a rushed sale to fund a settlement before the Administrative Labour Tribunal.

The improvements stay with the owner

Without an agreement on reimbursement, the fate of the work is governed by law. Under article 1891 C.C.Q., at the end of the lease, the tenant must remove the constructions, works or plantations it has made. If removing them would damage the property, the landlord may keep them by paying their value or require that the property be restored to its original condition; and if restoration is impossible, it may keep them without compensation. Obviously, levelling, subsoiling, or lime and manure spread on farmland cannot be removed. The judge also stresses that it was “reckless, to say the least” to incur most of these expenses while the negotiations had not been concluded.

One more hurdle: who actually paid?

In the alternative, the judge adds an important lesson for business owners. The lease had been signed by the farmer personally, but most of the work had been carried out and paid for by his companies, and it was one of them that sold the crops. Yet a company has a legal personality separate from that of its shareholder: the shareholder cannot claim, in his own name, a loss suffered by the company. You cannot take advantage of a corporate structure, notably for tax purposes, and then ignore it in court. At best, the farmer’s personal losses would have been under $20,000 with respect to the investments, and he could not have personally claimed lost profits earned by a company.

The evidence of the expenses was also weak: no invoices, no record of hours, a list prepared after the fact, in 2021, never sent to the Régie, and an expert who had relied on his client’s assumptions without independent verification. The action is dismissed with legal costs, including the fees of the Régie’s expert.

Why this decision stands out

It addresses a common reality in the farming world, where land is often leased from a neighbour, a municipality or an organization on the strength of trusting relationships and informal arrangements. Investing in the soil of leased land means investing in someone else’s property. Without a clear written agreement, the risk rests entirely on the tenant.

The outcome may seem harsh: the Régie was generally aware of the farmer’s investment plans, had accepted the principle of a 20-year lease and sold the land on which he had done the work for $1.4 million. The judge notes, moreover, that the claim was not based on unjust enrichment, and that no evidence made it possible to measure the added value the work may have brought to the land. Would a better-targeted and better-documented claim have fared differently? The judgment does not allow us to say so, but it suggests that the evidence would have been decisive.

Key takeaways

An agreement in principle is not a contract. Until the essential elements (price, term, compensation) have been accepted on both sides, there is no agreement. Respond to counter-proposals and get the final document signed.

With a municipality or public body, insist on a resolution. These bodies bind themselves by resolution or by-law. The word of an officer, however sincere, is not enough.

Do not invest in leased property without a written agreement on reimbursement. Otherwise, the law may allow the owner to keep the improvements without compensation where restoration is impossible, as is often the case with soil work.

Sign with the right entity. If your company is the one operating and paying, it should be the party to the contract, or each party’s role should be clearly set out.

Document your expenses as you go. Invoices, proof of payment, work logs: without them, even a legitimate claim can fail.

Mareva injunction vs. taking in payment: when the hypothecary lender goes ahead of the investors

William Desrochers — Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:05:56 +0000

Investors who say they were cheated obtain an order freezing the developer’s assets, including a property in Mont-Tremblant. Meanwhile, the property’s hypothecary lender exercises its recourse and becomes the owner, without notifying them. The investors ask that the judgment be set aside. The Superior Court refuses: a Mareva injunction protects against the dissipation of assets, but it confers no right in them.

When fraud is suspected, the reflex is often to “freeze” the alleged fraudster’s assets before they disappear. That is precisely what a Mareva injunction is for. But how far does it protect the creditors who obtain it against a lender holding a hypothec (the civil law equivalent of a mortgage) on the frozen asset? The judgment in Hypothèque Solution Québec inc. c. Manoir Winchester (2026 QCCS 2908), rendered on April 17, 2026, by the Honourable Daniel Beaulieu of the Superior Court (District of Québec), provides a clear answer.

The facts: a building, a hypothec and worried investors

In June 2023, a $1,300,000 hypothec was granted in favour of a lender, Hypothèque Solution Québec inc., and two individuals, to secure a loan on a property in Mont-Tremblant, which the company Manoir Winchester acquired a few days later. In 2025, a host of creditors, mainly investors, alleged that the head of this group had engaged in a fraudulent “Ponzi”-type scheme. These were allegations that had not been decided on the merits.

On February 18, 2025, the investors obtained a Mareva injunction prohibiting the principal, his companies and several related persons from selling, hypothecating or otherwise disposing of their assets. The Mont-Tremblant property was expressly listed among the assets covered. The order was renewed several times, then extended until judgment on the merits, and it was published in the land register. At one renewal, in March 2025, a judge ordered the hypothecary lender to produce its loan documents and specified that “any affected party” by the order “may seek directions from the Court” (our translation).

In April 2025, the lender confirmed that the borrower was in default on its hypothecary payments and that the building was no longer insured. On June 6, 2025, the lender published in the land register a prior notice of the exercise of a hypothecary right, namely its right to take the property in payment. On September 25, 2025, the Superior Court, sitting in Québec City, rendered judgment by default: finding a debt of $1,099,386.52, it ordered the surrender of the property and declared the lenders owners, retroactively to June 6, 2025. The investors learned of this on November 3, 2025, while trying to have a hearing scheduled for the sale of the building. On December 22, they applied for revocation of the judgment, that is, to have it set aside.

Two concepts to understand

A Mareva injunction is a freezing order. It prohibits a person from disposing of their assets pending final judgment, to prevent them from making those assets disappear. The court stressed its nature: it acts against the person targeted, not on the property itself. It gives the party who obtains it neither a real right in the property nor priority over other creditors.

Taking in payment is one of the recourses the Civil Code of Québec gives a hypothecary creditor when its debtor defaults. Rather than having the property sold, the creditor becomes its owner, and the debt is extinguished. An important consequence for other creditors: there is no sale, and therefore no possible surplus to share. That is what worried the investors, since the building had been listed for sale at $1.7 million in another proceeding.

The conditions for revocation at the request of a third person

Article 349 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) allows a person whose interests are affected by a judgment rendered without their having been called to the proceeding to apply for its revocation. The case law requires that person to show that they were unable to oppose the judgment, that their interests are affected, that they have serious grounds of defence and that they are acting within six months of learning of the judgment. This remedy is applied restrictively, in the name of the stability of judgments.

Justice Beaulieu readily acknowledged that the investors had not been called and that their interests were affected. He also rejected the lenders’ argument that the investors had lacked diligence by waiting 48 days: given the complexity of the case and the number of parties, that delay was not negligent. Everything therefore turned on the last criterion: did they have a serious ground of defence?

No prior notice owed to the beneficiaries of a Mareva

The investors’ main argument rested on article 2757 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.), which requires a creditor intending to exercise a hypothecary right to serve its prior notice on the debtor, on the grantor of the hypothec and “on any other person against whom he intends to exercise his right.” In their view, the Mareva gave them a sufficient interest in the building to be counted among those persons.

The court disagreed. Only a very limited number of persons are entitled to service of the prior notice. The judge relied on an analogy with seizure before judgment: according to legal scholarship, a creditor who has seized an immovable “undeniably has an interest,” but the seizure confers no real right, so the hypothecary creditor does not have to serve its prior notice on that creditor. If a seizing creditor is not entitled to it, neither is the beneficiary of a Mareva.

The March 2025 order changed nothing: by writing that any affected party “may” seek directions from the Court, the judge had granted an option, not created an obligation. As for abuse of rights, the judge acknowledged that the lenders could have shown more transparency, but refused to find that they had acted on the sly: their prior notice had been published in the land register since June 6, 2025, and the law presumes that a right entered in the register is known to anyone who later publishes a right on the same property, as the investors had done by registering their Mareva. Since taking in payment is a recourse expressly provided for in the Code, exercising it is not an abuse. The application for revocation was dismissed, with legal costs.

Why this decision stands out

It highlights a common misunderstanding. For the victim of a fraud, obtaining a Mareva injunction feels like having “seized hold” of the assets. In reality, a Mareva freezes the situation as regards the alleged fraudster, without changing the ranking of creditors. The hypothecary creditor, whose right is earlier and registered, retains all its recourses.

The judgment also distinguishes this case from another decision rendered in a related file, in which a judge had set aside a judgment obtained by other investors, mere ordinary creditors, who were trying to bypass the process for liquidating the building. The difference lies in the nature of the right: a hypothecary creditor is enforcing a legitimate security; an ordinary creditor has no priority.

One can nevertheless understand the investors’ frustration. The lender had been impleaded in the Mareva case since March 2025 and, after the judgment, its president even exchanged with the investors’ lawyer about a hearing on the sale of the building, before they were told it had already become the owner. The judge implicitly acknowledged this, writing that the lenders could have shown greater transparency. But the law of security interests rests on the publication of rights in the land register, and it is up to each party to keep watch.

Key takeaways

A Mareva injunction is not a security. It prevents the debtor from dissipating assets, but gives you no priority over a hypothecary creditor.

Register your address in the land register. The Code allows any interested person to request the registration of their address in respect of an immovable (article 3022 C.C.Q.). The land registrar must then notify that person of certain registrations, including that of a prior notice of exercise (article 3017 C.C.Q.). The lenders pointed this out, and the legal scholarship cited by the judge confirms it.

Actively monitor the land register. A published prior notice of exercise is presumed to be known. Do not count on the hypothecary creditor to warn you.

There are ways to protect a building’s residual value. The judge noted that the investors could have resorted to subrogation, in particular by paying the prior-ranking creditor to take its place. The Code also provides that subsequent hypothecary creditors or the debtor may, under certain conditions (article 2779 C.C.Q.), force the creditor to abandon taking in payment in favour of a sale; that recourse, however, requires holding a hypothec oneself, which the investors did not. These tools require prompt action, within the prescribed time limits.

For lenders: a Mareva targeting your debtor does not, in principle, prevent you from exercising your hypothecary rights, as long as the order does not target you yourself. Transparency nonetheless remains good practice, if only to avoid costly litigation.

Divorced in the UAE, still fighting in Quebec: who decides support and property division?

William Desrochers — Wed, 04 Nov 2026 21:05:36 +0000

They lived their married life in the United Arab Emirates. She came back to Quebec with their daughter; he filed for divorce over there. Four years, two countries and more than a million dollars in legal fees later, the Superior Court must decide who will rule on what remains: support, a provision for legal costs and the division of property. A decision full of lessons for every family whose life straddles two countries.

The international mobility of families raises questions most people only ask themselves when the relationship ends: which court has jurisdiction? Which law applies? Is a divorce granted abroad valid in Quebec? The judgment in Droit de la famille — 26711 (2026 QCCS 2119), rendered on May 11, 2026, by the Honourable Johanne Mainville of the Superior Court (District of Montréal), answers each of these questions in a particularly acrimonious case in which neither party is still represented by a lawyer.

The facts: a marriage in the Emirates, a breakdown in Quebec

Both parties are Canadian citizens. The husband, who arrived in Canada in 2003, left the country at the end of 2009 and, in 2012, settled in a city in the UAE (referred to as “Ville A” in the judgment), where he held senior management positions. The wife, a real estate broker, also worked there from 2010-2011 onward, while keeping her condo in Quebec. The couple signed two marriage contracts before a notary in Quebec: in 2012, separation as to property, then, in 2015, the société d’acquêts (partnership of acquests, a regime under which property acquired during the marriage is shared). The church wedding took place in Ville A in 2014; their daughter was born in Quebec in 2015. Every summer, the mother and child spent several months in Quebec.

In December 2021, the wife left Ville A with the child for Quebec, announcing a stay of a few months. She never went back, citing physical and psychological violence by the husband, which he categorically denies. In August 2022, the husband filed for divorce in Ville A and asked for the return of the mother and child. In September 2022, the wife applied to the Quebec Superior Court for separation from bed and board, with all the accessory measures: custody, support for herself and the child, division of the family patrimony and liquidation of the partnership of acquests. A safeguard order (an interim order made while the case is pending), issued by default in October 2022, set, among other things, support of $20,000 a month for the wife.

On May 24, 2023, the Ville A court granted the divorce, awarded custody of the child to the mother and dismissed the return application, taking the father’s violence into account. That judgment was upheld on appeal and then by the Court of Cassation. The foreign court did not rule on support: the wife had instructed her lawyer to withdraw her financial claims so that they could be decided in Quebec. In July 2024, the husband moved to Quebec; support arrears piled up, his passport was suspended in September 2024 and, in December 2025, the sale of his two condos was authorized. In February 2026, he filed a declinatory exception: he asked the Superior Court to declare that it lacked jurisdiction in favour of the Emirates and to declare all orders made since 2022 lapsed.

Can a court’s jurisdiction be challenged after four years?

The wife argued that the husband, who had actively taken part in the Quebec proceedings and had discontinued his jurisdictional challenges in 2024, could no longer raise the issue. The judge deplored that such an exception was brought more than four years after the proceedings began, but concluded that the husband was not foreclosed: custody and support are matters of public order, and the Court of Appeal has held that lack of jurisdiction in this area may be raised at any time. In passing, she noted the sharp divergence in the case law and legal scholarship on the exact nature of the international jurisdiction of Quebec courts.

Do the Quebec courts have jurisdiction?

Yes. The husband relied on “international lis pendens,” that is, the existence of an identical proceeding already under way abroad. The judge recalled that this requires the same parties, the same cause and the same object. Yet separation from bed and board (provided for in the Civil Code of Québec, which does not dissolve the marriage) and divorce (provided for in the Divorce Act, which does) have neither the same cause nor the same object. The Quebec courts had jurisdiction over the separation from bed and board, since the wife was residing in Quebec when she filed her application (article 3146 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.)), which also gave them jurisdiction over custody.

The foreign divorce renders the separation from bed and board moot, but only as regards the marriage bond itself. As the Court of Appeal has already recognized, when a divorce has been granted by a competent foreign authority, a Quebec court may rule on the accessory measures that were not decided. The wife, who resides in Quebec, will simply have to convert her application for separation from bed and board into an application for corollary relief following the divorce, which the judge described as a “formality.” As for the safeguard orders made since 2022, they have not lapsed: the Code allows Quebec authorities to order provisional or urgent measures, and setting them aside would cause certain harm to the child and the mother.

Forum non conveniens: sending the case back to the Emirates?

Even when it has jurisdiction, a Quebec court may, exceptionally, decline to exercise it if it considers that the authorities of another State are better placed to decide the dispute (article 3135 C.C.Q.). This is known as forum non conveniens. The judge reviewed the ten criteria recognized in the case law and concluded that no single, clearly more appropriate forum emerged. She noted in particular that the parties are Canadian citizens, that the child was born in Quebec and has lived there for more than four years, that the marriage contracts were signed in Quebec, that property is located there, that no financial proceedings are pending in the Emirates, that the mother, who has no resident status there and is no longer sponsored by the husband, may not be able to live there, and that the Emirates are not a signatory to the Hague Convention. The exception was dismissed.

Which law applies? A three-part answer

Having jurisdiction does not mean applying one’s own law. Quebec private international law sometimes points to a foreign law. Its content must then be proven, usually through an expert. Failing that, the court applies Quebec law (article 2809 C.C.Q.). This is where the judgment becomes particularly instructive.

The matrimonial regime and its amendments: Quebec law. The content of UAE law on this question was not sufficiently established; the husband’s expert had filed some 500 pages of statutory texts, and the judge pointed out that it is not up to the court to dig through them to find an answer.

Support and the provision for legal costs: Quebec and Canadian law. According to the expert evidence, the UAE’s 2005 law provides no support for the ex-wife beyond a short period following the divorce; as for the new 2022 law applicable to non-Muslims, it causes the ex-wife to lose support if she loses custody, and limits the father’s contribution to custody-related costs to two years in the case of joint custody. The judge set aside the 2005 law, which would lead to a result manifestly inconsistent with public order (article 3081 C.C.Q.), and the 2022 law, because of the uncertainty surrounding its application (its implementing regulations had not been published when the expert reports were prepared) and because, in her view, those rules are contrary to public order.

The family patrimony: UAE law… which has no such thing. This is the surprise of the judgment. The family patrimony (which includes, among other things, the family residences, the household furniture, the family vehicles and the rights accumulated in retirement plans) is classified among the “effects of marriage,” which are governed by the law of the spouses’ domicile (article 3089 C.C.Q.). The parties, however, were domiciled in the Emirates, whose law provides no comparable mechanism. The wife therefore cannot obtain its division in Quebec.

Finally, at the request of both parties, the Court recognized the Ville A divorce judgment and declared it enforceable in Quebec: the foreign authority had jurisdiction, since the husband was domiciled there and had resided there for at least one year, and none of the exceptions provided for in the Code was established.

Why this decision stands out

First, it shows how a simple move abroad can change a couple’s rights. The family patrimony is a matter of public order in Quebec: spouses domiciled there cannot waive it in advance, even by marriage contract. Yet because the couple’s domicile was in the Emirates, the wife loses the benefit of it. The contrast is striking with the validity of the amendments to their matrimonial regime (the partnership of acquests chosen by notarial contract in Quebec), which will be assessed under Quebec law for lack of sufficient proof of the foreign law.

This conclusion is open to debate. One may wonder why public order, which made it possible to set aside the foreign rules on support, did not operate in the same way with respect to the family patrimony, which was designed precisely to protect the economically vulnerable spouse. One may also note that the judge herself found that it is not known which UAE rules apply to the division of property, which, under article 2809 C.C.Q., could have led to Quebec law. The solution adopted is nonetheless grounded in the Court of Appeal’s consistent characterization of the family patrimony as an “effect of marriage,” and in the wording of article 3089 C.C.Q. The debate could resurface in another case.

Second, the judgment shows the human and financial cost of a conflict that drags on: more than a million dollars in legal fees according to a judge who heard the case earlier, a child who has not seen her father in years and a parent who considers himself a “prisoner” in Canada. The judge noted that the husband is partly the author of his own misfortune, having, among other things, withdrawn his own claims and failed to comply with the safeguard orders.

Key takeaways

Your domicile largely determines your rights. Before settling abroad with your spouse, find out how that country’s law treats support, the division of property and child custody.

A marriage contract does not settle everything. The notarial contracts signed in Quebec did not, on their own, determine the applicable law: it was for lack of sufficient proof of UAE law that the judge applied Quebec law to the matrimonial regime (article 2809 C.C.Q.). If you plan to live abroad, have a professional check which law will govern your matrimonial regime.

A foreign divorce does not prevent you from seeking relief in Quebec. If the foreign court did not rule on support or property, and you reside in Quebec, the Superior Court can do so. Recognition of the foreign judgment can be sought in the same proceeding.

Foreign law must be proven, and proven up to date. A party who wants a foreign law to apply must establish its content through precise and recent expert evidence. A three-year-old opinion, given before the implementing regulations were published, was not enough here.

Safeguard orders must be obeyed. Support arrears can lead to severe measures, up to and including the suspension of a passport and the forced sale of real property.

“Just a formality”: an 84-year-old tenant did not give up her lease by signing the new owner’s paper

William Desrochers — Sat, 31 Oct 2026 21:54:46 +0000

The building has been sold. The former owner and a broker show up at the tenant’s door, a woman now 84 years old, with a document in English that the broker describes as a mere formality. She signs on the spot. A few months later, she is told she will have to leave to make room for the new owner’s daughter. The Administrative Housing Tribunal refuses to evict her. A decision that underscores the strength of the right to maintain occupancy.

In Quebec, the sale of a building does not end the tenants’ leases: the new owner steps into the former owner’s shoes, with the same rights and the same obligations. To take back a dwelling, the owner must follow a specific procedure. Some buyers are tempted to get around these rules by having the tenant sign a document. The decision Nikolis c. Chartrand-Debbané (2026 QCTAL 12131), rendered on April 15, 2026, by Administrative Judge Suzanne Guévremont of the Administrative Housing Tribunal (TAL) in Montréal, shows the limits of that strategy.

The facts: a document signed in a hurry

The tenant has lived in a dwelling in the Town of Mount Royal since December 2016. She is attached to her neighbourhood, where she has lived for more than thirty years. Her initial three-year lease was renewed for five years, then again as of December 1, 2024, at a rent of $2,075 per month. She says she entered into a long-term lease precisely so that she could stay there for a long time.

In the fall of 2024, her former landlord, with whom she had always been on good terms, sold the building. On November 1, the landlord texted her that the building had been sold, that she had kept her word by finding a buyer who did not want to break the lease, and that she would give her a document confirming that she could stay in the dwelling and that her lease would not be cancelled, a document which, she wrote in English, was required by the notary. On November 5, the former landlord came to the tenant’s home with a real estate broker. According to the tenant’s testimony, the broker presented a document in English entitled “Notice to Tenant” as a mere formality and pressed her to sign; feeling rushed and stressed, she signed right away.

The document states, among other things, that the buyer acknowledges the lease, understands that it will be automatically renewed on December 1, 2024, undertakes not to seek to end it and to let the tenant stay until the end of the renewal term, and will not repossess the dwelling before the end of that term. According to the decision, the new owner was not present at the meeting and did not sign the document.

On January 29, 2025, the tenant says, the new owner’s mother came to her home to tell her she would have to leave on December 1, 2025, so that her daughter could move in. A long-time friend testified that the tenant called her that day in a panic. The new owner then applied to the TAL for her eviction, arguing that the document was an agreement to terminate the lease on November 30, 2025. The tenant, for her part, saw it only as an acknowledgment of her right to stay.

A telling admission at the hearing

The owner did not testify; her mother represented her. On cross-examination, the mother admitted that her daughter is an undivided co-owner of the building, which, she said, prevented her from repossessing the dwelling, and that this was why the document was signed. She also admitted that it was the only “agreement” made with the tenant, and that her daughter’s promise to purchase was made at the same time.

This admission touches on a little-known rule. In principle, the owner of a building held in undivided co-ownership, that is, owned by several people without being divided into separate units, cannot repossess a dwelling, unless there is only one other co-owner and that person is his or her spouse, subject to acquired rights for certain buildings acquired several decades ago (depending on the number of dwellings, before 1981 or around 1987-1988) (article 1958 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.)). The judge does not rule on this rule, but the admission sheds light on the context.

Residential lease rules protect tenants, even from themselves

The judge first points out that it was up to the owner to prove that the tenant had waived her right to stay in the premises. Yet the document, which “is hardly a model of clarity,” nowhere contains an undertaking by the tenant to leave the dwelling. The tenant’s explanation, that she saw it as a mere acknowledgment of her right, “holds up” (our translation).

The judge adds that the rules of the Civil Code of Québec on leases of dwellings are of public order, meaning they cannot be set aside by contract. Most of them are of “protective” public order: they exist to protect the tenant. This is the case for the right to maintain occupancy, the rules on renewal of the lease and those on repossession of a dwelling. The protected person may waive that protection, but not in advance. A waiver is only possible once the right has arisen, and only if it is voluntary, clear and made with full knowledge of the facts.

Even if the document had been an agreement to end the lease, it would have been premature and based on false premises, including an invalid notice of repossession: such a notice must be given while the lease in question is in force and must meet the content requirements set out in the Code. Finally, given how quickly the meeting took place, the judge does not believe the tenant had all the information needed to give informed consent. Since her consent was vitiated, there was no meeting of the minds. Nor was it a transaction (a settlement agreement under Quebec civil law), since the owner had made no real concession. The application is dismissed, with costs.

Why this decision stands out

It highlights a practice seen all too often when rental buildings are sold: having the tenant hastily sign a document presented as harmless. Here, the document, written in English, had been announced by the former landlord as required by the notary, then presented by the broker as a mere formality, during a quick meeting with an elderly woman; the judge concludes that she did not have all the information needed to give informed consent. The TAL refuses to treat it as a waiver of a tenant’s most fundamental right: the right to stay in her home.

The decision is also a reminder that buying a building in order to house a relative must be planned around the rules on repossession of a dwelling. A buyer who holds the building in undivided co-ownership, other than with her spouse alone, generally cannot repossess a dwelling, and, in our view, no document signed by the tenant can get around that rule in advance.

Finally, note that since 2024 the law gives greater protection to senior tenants: in principle, a landlord cannot repossess the dwelling of a tenant aged 65 or over who has lived there for at least ten years and whose income does not exceed a certain threshold, subject to exceptions. This protection was not discussed in the decision; based on the dates reported, the tenant had lived in the dwelling for less than ten years at the relevant time. If her lease continues until 2029, as she maintains, she could however one day meet the length-of-occupancy requirement, with the income requirement still to be verified. The case nonetheless shows that, even outside these situations, the general rules are often enough to protect the tenant.

Key takeaways

Tenants: do not sign anything under pressure. If you are handed a document when your building is sold, ask for a copy, take the time to read it and have it checked, and translated if necessary, before signing. You are under no obligation to sign on the spot.

The sale of the building does not end your lease. The new owner is bound by your lease. If the owner wants to repossess the dwelling, the procedure set out in the law must be followed, including sending you a written notice within the required time (generally at least six months before the end of a lease of more than six months), and you have one month to respond; your silence is deemed a refusal, and it is then up to the owner to apply to the TAL within the following month.

You cannot waive your rights as a tenant in advance. A clause or document by which you waive in advance the renewal of your lease or agree to a future repossession is, in principle, without effect.

Buyers: check before you buy. If you are buying a building to house a relative, check whether repossession will be possible (ownership structure, age and length of occupancy of the tenants, deadlines). A poorly designed document will never replace a proper repossession procedure.

Small claims: your claim can lapse without you knowing it — a Gatineau judge sounds the alarm

William Desrochers — Sat, 31 Oct 2026 21:54:30 +0000

In small claims, it is not the citizen who serves the claim on the other side: it is the Court of Québec’s court office. But what happens when the court office fails to do so? In a judgment rendered in Gatineau on October 19, 2026, the Court found that a claim filed in July 2025 had never been validly served, and refused to let the court office try to repair the damage on its own. A useful reminder for everyone who represents themselves.

The Small Claims Division of the Court of Québec is designed to let citizens resolve disputes of $15,000 or less on their own, without a lawyer. To make the system accessible, the Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) assigns the court office several tasks that, in an ordinary lawsuit, fall to the parties, including serving the claim on the defendant. The judgment in Palmer c. Duchesne (2026 QCCQ 4883), rendered by the Honourable Stéphane D. Tremblay of the Court of Québec, Small Claims Division, District of Gatineau, shows what can happen when this mechanism breaks down, and why litigants need to keep an eye on their own file.

The facts: fifteen months without service

The plaintiff filed her claim on July 7, 2025. The court office tried to serve it by certified mail, without success. On November 7, 2025, noting that the claim had lapsed as of October 7, the court office asked to be relieved from its default and sought an additional year to serve the claim at a new address. On November 11, 2025, the special clerk relieved it from its default and gave it until January 30, 2026. Nothing was done within that time.

On February 20, 2026, the court office drafted a second application, almost identical to the first, which was placed in the file but never presented for a decision. On February 25, 2026, the plaintiff herself asked for permission to serve her claim by email. Her request, although received, was never submitted to the court or to the special clerk. Finally, on July 27, 2026, the court office filed a third application to be relieved from its default, citing an “administrative overload,” with no supporting sworn statement. The file was referred to the judge.

Along the way, by comparing two versions of the plumitif (the docket that records, in chronological order, every step in a court file), the judge noticed that one entry had been altered after the fact and another deleted. Without attributing any intent, and without ruling out administrative error, he noted that these discrepancies raise questions about the reliability of this public record.

Three months to serve, or the claim lapses

Under article 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an originating application that is not served within three months of being filed lapses. The case law cited by the judge specifies that this lapse occurs without any further formality: the claim dies on its own when the time limit expires. And an important consequence follows: a lapsed claim does not interrupt prescription (the Quebec civil law equivalent of a limitation period). In other words, the time to sue keeps running as if the claim had never been filed.

All is not lost, however. This three-month limit is not a “strict” (mandatory) time limit. Under article 84 C.C.P., the court may extend the time limit and relieve a party from the consequences of its default. But this is not automatic: the court considers, among other things, the seriousness of the application, the strength of the reasons given for the delay, the party’s diligence and the quality of the supporting evidence.

Why the court office could not act in the plaintiff’s place

The judge declared the court office’s application inadmissible on the basis of three findings he described as “fatal,” that is, defects that undermine the application at its very root.

No power to act. Clerks exercise only the powers the law grants them (article 67 C.C.P.). In small claims, the law entrusts them with serving the claim (article 546 C.C.P.) and with assisting the parties (article 543 C.C.P.), a role limited to providing information, ensuring that the proper forms are followed and transmitting documents, without giving legal advice. Nothing allows them to draft and present, on a party’s behalf, an application to save that party’s claim. Deciding whether to ask to be relieved from a default is a strategic choice that belongs to the party, because it is the party who stands to lose the right.

No interest. No one may bring a matter before the court without a sufficient interest (article 85 C.C.P.), which, according to the case law, must be direct and personal. The court office has no interest in a private dispute between two citizens. The judge draws an illuminating comparison: when a lawyer misses a deadline through his or her own fault, it is the client who asks to be relieved from the default, not the lawyer in his or her own name.

Breach of the right to be heard. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had been notified of the court office’s application. Yet the defendant was legitimately entitled to benefit from the lapse, and possibly from a defence based on prescription. Granting the court office’s application would have deprived her of that benefit without giving her a chance to be heard, contrary to article 17 C.C.P. The judge concluded that the court office, in trying to make up for its own shortcomings, had put itself in conflict with the rights of one of the parties and had, in essence, acted to favour one party at the expense of the other.

The judge adds that transparency would instead have required informing the plaintiff that her claim had lapsed, so that she could decide for herself what to do next. Finally, he notes that the parties remain free to bring any appropriate proceeding before the court.

Why this decision stands out

It is rare for a judge to speak so firmly about how a court office operates. Judge Tremblay refers to a “troubling misunderstanding of the fundamental role of the court office” and writes that the claim of administrative overload “in reality serves as a pretext” (our translation). He acknowledges that the court office has limited resources, but refuses to let that reality justify treating statutory time limits as “mere suggestions.”

One might object that the court office meant well: it was trying to save the claim of a plaintiff whose file had been left hanging. According to the judge, that is precisely the heart of the problem. The small claims system depends on both parties trusting the neutrality of the justice system. A court office that takes it upon itself to defend one party’s interests, without either party knowing, compromises that neutrality, even with the best of intentions.

The judgment also raises, without deciding it, a delicate question: if the court office’s negligence caused the plaintiff to lose her rights, could she complain about it? The judge writes that it would then be up to her to draw the appropriate legal consequences, and notes that by obtaining an extension, the court office would, among other things, have avoided “a potential liability claim.” The door is left ajar, nothing more.

Key takeaways

Follow your file actively. Even though the court office serves your claim, you are the one who risks losing your case. A few weeks after filing, check with the court office: has the claim been served? On what date?

Keep the three-month limit in mind. If service fails (wrong address, unclaimed mail), react right away. You can provide a new address or ask the court to authorize another method of service, for example by email, as the plaintiff did in this case.

Watch out for prescription. Unless it is relieved from the default, a lapsed claim does not interrupt prescription. Remember that a claim filed before the prescription period expires interrupts it, provided it is served no later than 60 days after that expiry (article 2892 C.C.Q.). If the time to sue (often three years in Quebec) is running out, the situation becomes urgent: you must quickly ask to be relieved from the default, with solid evidence and a sworn statement, or file a new claim while there is still time.

Get advice. In small claims, you must represent yourself at the hearing, but nothing prevents you from consulting a lawyer to check your deadlines, prepare your claim and exhibits, or get ready for the hearing. Many cases can also be settled through the free mediation offered by the Ministère de la Justice.

Married for papers? Why the Court refused to annul a marriage after nine years of living together

William Desrochers — Sat, 31 Oct 2026 21:53:26 +0000

She met him on holiday in Cuba, married him, sponsored his move to Canada and paid for the wedding. Shortly after he arrived, she says, the man in love became a completely different person. Convinced she had been trapped in a marriage arranged for immigration purposes, she asked the court, sixteen years later, to annul her marriage. The Superior Court said no. The decision is a reminder of just how exceptional annulment of a marriage remains in Quebec.

People often speak of a “marriage of convenience” or a “sham marriage” to describe a union entered into for the sole purpose of obtaining immigration status. For the person who was deceived, the temptation is strong to simply erase the marriage rather than divorce. Quebec law allows this, but only under strict conditions. The judgment in Droit de la famille — 261510 (2026 QCCS 3668), rendered on September 23, 2026 by the Honourable Éric Dufour of the Superior Court of Québec (District of Laval), is a clear illustration.

The facts: love at first sight in the sun, then disillusionment

In 2008, while on holiday in Cuba, the woman met the man through a hotel employee. The week was idyllic. Wary at first, since she knew some people are lured into traps during vacations in the south, she decided to trust him. She returned in May 2008 for about two weeks and then, before accepting his marriage proposal, lived at his home for three months, from February to May 2009, where she met his family and friends. Reassured, she began the process of sponsoring him with the immigration authorities as soon as she got back. The wedding took place in Cuba on August 5, 2009; she paid for it.

A few weeks later, once the sponsorship was approved, he arrived in Quebec. According to her testimony, his behaviour then changed radically: lack of interest, fits of anger, drinking, lost jobs. One day, she found emails on the computer exchanged with another woman who had stayed in the Caribbean, which, in her view, left no doubt: this woman was pregnant by him, and the two of them were planning to reunite in Canada. When confronted, he told her: “I love you both.” In 2011, she says she learned during a trip to Cuba that the man’s entire circle had known about the plan.

She nonetheless chose to give the relationship another chance. She describes a very difficult married life, marked by arguments and episodes of violence. It was only in 2018 that she asked him to leave the house. In 2025, she filed an application to annul the marriage and claimed $7,000 in damages. He did not file an answer within the prescribed time, so the case proceeded by default. He still appeared at the hearing, where the judge allowed him to make submissions, but not to present evidence.

Annulling a marriage is not the same as divorcing

Two very different things must first be distinguished. Divorce ends a valid marriage. Annulment, on the other hand, declares that the marriage was never validly formed, because an essential condition was missing when it was celebrated (subject to the effects the law preserves in favour of a spouse acting in good faith). One of those conditions is consent: federal law requires the free and enlightened consent of two persons to take each other as spouses.

The judge points out that courts do not grant annulments lightly. Marriage is a fundamental institution with significant consequences (the patrimoine familial, or family patrimony, spousal support and the matrimonial regime). The Quebec Court of Appeal has long insisted that annulment applications be given a “particularly serious” review, so as not to encourage ill-considered unions. And even where the other party does not contest, the court must, on its own initiative if need be, find that a claim is time-barred.

The three-year limit, and its exception

Under article 380 of the Civil Code of Québec (C.C.Q.), an action for nullity of marriage may not be brought once three years have elapsed since the marriage was solemnized, unless public order is at stake, in particular where the consent of one of the spouses was not free or enlightened. That last clarification was added to the Code in 2016. According to the Court of Appeal, this time limit can be neither interrupted nor suspended. The wife’s alternative argument, that her time limit had been suspended by her husband’s hold over her and by her depression, therefore seemed weak; the judge did not, however, have to decide it.

Here, the marriage dated from 2009 and the application from 2025, so the three-year limit was long past. The wife had to show that public order was at stake. On that point, she succeeded: case law widely recognizes that a marriage entered into for the sole purpose of obtaining Canadian citizenship, with no intention whatsoever of living together, engages public order. Her application was therefore not out of time. She still had to prove it.

Along the way, the judge flags an interesting debate. In 2009, in Droit de la famille — 091179, the Court of Appeal held that not every defect of consent engages public order. One may wonder whether the 2016 amendment, which now expressly refers to free and enlightened consent, changes the picture. The judge raises the question, but notes that until the Court of Appeal rules on it again, the 2009 decision remains the law.

The heart of the case: proving intention at the time of the marriage

The person seeking annulment does not have to meet a higher standard than usual: as in any civil case, she must persuade the court that her version is more likely than not. But what she must prove is delicate: that her spouse never really intended to share a life with her when they married, and that he used her to immigrate. Since there is rarely direct evidence of such an intention, it is usually shown through “serious, precise and concordant” presumptions, meaning a set of significant clues that all point in the same direction.

The court also stresses an essential nuance: the wish to immigrate to Canada can coexist with a genuine intention to live together as a couple. Wanting to immigrate is not, in itself, a ground for annulment. What matters is the total absence of any intention to live as a couple.

Yet, for Justice Dufour, the wife’s evidence “lacks clarity and is not convincing” (our translation). Several factors worked against her:

the parties lived together for nine years, from 2009 to 2018, including after she discovered what she describes as a scheme;
the evidence of the husband’s plan rested essentially on her own testimony: the emails and text messages filed were written in Spanish, with no official translation, and came with summaries she had written herself;
she had embarked on a risky venture, which the case law takes into account: the deterioration of a relationship after arrival in Canada does not, on its own, prove the absence of matrimonial intention on the day of the wedding;
the application was filed only in 2025, seven years after the cohabitation ended, whereas courts tend to annul marriages where the cohabitation was short-lived or where the claim was brought promptly after the facts were discovered.

Even if proven, the nullity would have been “confirmed”

In the alternative, the judge adds a second ground. A defect of consent in principle leads to what Quebec civil law calls “relative” nullity, that is, a nullity designed to protect one particular person. Such a nullity can be cured by confirmation: the protected person waives, expressly or through her conduct, the right to invoke the nullity, provided her intention to do so is certain and evident (articles 1419, 1420 and 1423 C.C.Q.).

By continuing to live with her husband for years after discovering the emails, and by wanting the union to work at all costs, the wife would, according to the court, have confirmed the validity of her marriage. For lack of sufficient evidence, the application for annulment was dismissed, without legal costs. The judge specifies that, had he annulled the marriage, he would have awarded her the $7,000 claimed, as her testimony had persuaded him of the extent of what she had been through.

Why this decision stands out

First, it illustrates a human paradox. A person who believes she has been deceived and who, out of loyalty or hope, chooses to “give the relationship a chance” weakens her annulment claim at the same time. The law may treat that perseverance as confirmation of the marriage. It is harsh, but it is consistent with the stability that surrounds the institution of marriage.

Second, the judgment shows that an uncontested case is not a case won in advance. Even without a defence, the court rigorously examines both admissibility and the evidence. Faced with documents in a foreign language without an official translation, the court may decline to consider their content.

Finally, the decision leaves open a legal question worth watching: did the 2016 amendment to article 380 broaden the situations in which a defect of consent allows a party to escape the three-year limit? Some litigants will argue that the legislature meant to make these claims easier; the position currently followed by the Superior Court, in line with the 2009 decision, nonetheless remains restrictive.

Key takeaways

Act quickly. The three-year limit after the wedding is the rule. Beyond it, you must show that public order is at stake, and the more time passes, the harder the evidence becomes.

Preserve your evidence and have it translated. Emails, messages, testimony from people close to you: keep everything. Any document written in a language other than French or English should come with an official translation.

Continuing to live together has legal consequences. Staying with your spouse after discovering the deception may be interpreted as confirming the marriage.

Divorce is often the safer route. Its conditions are much more flexible: one year of separation is enough. The effects of annulment and divorce are not the same, however (family patrimony, matrimonial regime, support), and the law provides special rules for a spouse in good faith. Getting legal advice before choosing between the two is strongly recommended.

Don’t forget the immigration side. Annulment or divorce does not automatically settle the sponsorship undertakings given to the immigration authorities. It is wise to check your obligations with a professional in that field.

Cancelling a Contract in Québec: The Real Cooling-Off Periods

William Desrochers — Wed, 28 Oct 2026 14:59:07 +0000

The universal “cooling-off period” is a myth — here are the situations where the law actually lets you change your mind, and the other ways out of a contract.

One Saturday in May, Karine visits a dealership “just to look.” Three hours later, she drives off in a vehicle financed over 84 months. Sunday night, she redoes her budget at the kitchen table: $640 a month for seven years. Monday morning, she calls the dealership, a little panicked. “I have 10 days to cancel, it’s the law.” She’s told a contract is a contract and she should have thought of that before signing. Who’s right? Both of them, partly: it all depends on the type of contract signed and how many hours have passed since it was signed. Here is the real map of the ways out.

The myth of the universal cooling-off period

The bad news first: there is no general right to change your mind after signing a contract in Québec. Cancellation periods are exceptions set out case by case in the Loi sur la protection du consommateur, Quebec’s Consumer Protection Act (the LPC); they apply only between a consumer and a merchant acting in the course of its business. A private sale between two individuals on Marketplace is not covered.

A common trap: the clock generally does not start running on delivery, but from the moment each party holds a duplicate of the contract.

The time limits the LPC actually provides, case by case

A contract made by an itinerant merchant — the door-to-door heat-pump salesperson — can be cancelled at the consumer’s discretion within 10 days of the day each party holds a duplicate. That period stretches to one year in several situations: an unlicensed merchant, a non-compliant security bond, an incomplete contract, no Statement of Cancellation Rights attached, or non-delivery within 30 days of the expected date (section 59 LPC). A fault by the merchant, in other words, opens a much wider door.

A loan of money and a contract involving credit — Karine’s car financing is one — can be cancelled at the consumer’s discretion, at no charge or penalty, within two days of the day each party holds a duplicate of the contract (section 73 LPC). Short, but real. Since August 1, 2019, the same section allows 10 days for a high-cost credit contract, defined by regulation as one whose rate exceeds the Bank of Canada’s official discount rate by 22 percentage points. That regime also requires the merchant to assess the consumer’s ability to repay and to give the consumer that assessment in writing (section 103.4 LPC).

A distance contract — online, by phone — holds a surprise: there is no general right to return an online purchase. The consumer can cancel the contract within 7 days of receiving a copy of it, but only in the situations listed in section 54.8 LPC: required information not disclosed, no opportunity to accept, decline, or correct an error, a non-compliant contract, or an unusable copy. The period stretches to 30 days if no copy was ever sent, and the contract can also be cancelled if the merchant fails to perform its main obligation within 30 days of the agreed date. A retailer’s return policy is a business courtesy, not a legal right.

A contract for services performed over time — lessons, personal training, dating services — can be terminated at any time, at the consumer’s discretion, using the form attached to the contract or another written notice, with termination taking effect as soon as it is sent (section 193 LPC). A separate set of rules governs health studios, meaning gyms (sections 197 and following, LPC), with strict limits on term length, advance payment, and the indemnity a gym can charge. A gym that refuses any cancellation before the end of a three-year membership is simply wrong.

Travel agencies fall under the Loi sur les agents de voyages, the Travel Agents Act: licence holders are overseen by the Office de la protection du consommateur, and the Travel Agents’ Customers Compensation Fund can reimburse services paid for but never received. There is no general cancellation period here: your rights depend on the contract and the package you bought.

Instalment sales: when the merchant wants the goods back

In an instalment sale, the merchant remains the owner of the goods until they are paid for in full and, on default, may exercise a right of repossession. This protection is little known: “Where, at the time the consumer defaults, he has paid at least one half of the sum of the total obligation and the cash down payment, the merchant may not exercise his right of repossession unless he obtains leave of the court” (section 142 LPC). A court can refuse repossession outright, and can even revise the payment terms.

Do the math before you fight it: if the vehicle is worth less than the balance owing, repossession may actually be your best outcome. And a repossession notice that doesn’t meet the legal requirements can be challenged too.

When no time limit applies: a defect in consent

Outside the situations set out in the LPC, a contract isn’t set aside because you regret it, but because consent to it was defective.

Consent can be vitiated by error — about the nature of the contract, its object, or an essential element that led you to contract —, by fraud (dol): a scheme, a lie, or a misleading silence that led you to contract, or to contract on different terms; by fear of serious injury; or by lesion (lésion), a serious imbalance between what each party gives and gets. One caveat: an inexcusable error — made by someone who simply didn’t bother reading the contract — does not vitiate consent. And lesion, outside the cases expressly provided for by law, vitiates consent only in favour of minors and of adults under tutorship (the Quebec regime for representing an adult found incapable of managing their own affairs) or a protection mandate (article 1405 C.c.Q.).

In consumer law, the door opens wider: a consumer can seek to have the contract annulled, or the obligations reduced, where the imbalance between what each side gives amounts to exploitation, or where the consumer’s own obligation is excessive, harsh, or unconscionable (section 8 LPC). Courts do not all agree on how much weight to give the objective side — the imbalance itself — versus the subjective side — whether the consumer was actually exploited.

The legal warranty, durability, and what Bill 29 added

Another way out — often the right one: the goods are defective. The LPC requires that goods “be fit for the purposes for which goods of that kind are ordinarily used” for a reasonable length of time, “having regard to their price, the terms of the contract and their conditions of use” (section 38). This legal warranty exists regardless of any paid extended warranty.

Bill 29 — the Loi protégeant les consommateurs contre l’obsolescence programmée et favorisant la durabilité, la réparabilité et l’entretien des biens, Quebec’s Act to protect consumers from planned obsolescence and to promote the durability, repairability and maintenance of goods, assented to on October 5, 2023 — has been strengthening this regime in stages: October 5, 2023, April 5, 2024, January 5, 2025, October 5, 2025, and October 5, 2026. Among other things, it prohibits goods built with planned obsolescence, guarantees the availability of replacement parts and repair services, bans techniques that interfere with repair, and adds a “lemon law” measure for seriously defective vehicles.

The most anticipated piece, the warranty of good working order — an automatic, free right to repair for goods like refrigerators, dishwashers, televisions, and heat pumps — has been in force since October 5, 2026. It covers new goods bought or leased from a merchant on or after that date, for a period set by regulation for each type of good (three to six years). An appliance bought before October 5, 2026 does not benefit from it, but remains covered by the legal warranty of durability under section 38. Check the date of your purchase.

Key takeaways

There is no general cooling-off period: every cancellation right comes from a specific LPC provision.
Itinerant-merchant contract: 10 days, up to one year if the merchant failed to meet its obligations.
Loan of money or credit contract: two days; 10 days for high-cost credit.
Online purchase: no automatic return right, except under section 54.8 LPC or where delivery is more than 30 days late.
A contract for services performed over time covered by the LPC (courses, training, dating services) can be terminated at any time by written notice.
With no time limit available, look at defects in consent, section 8 LPC, and the legal warranty of durability.

Abandoned Construction Site: Your Remedies When a Contract Is Not Honoured

William Desrochers — Wed, 28 Oct 2026 14:58:39 +0000

Formal notice, specific performance, contract termination, damages: what the Civil Code really lets you demand.

The contract was signed back in February: a kitchen extension, due by Labour Day, $78,000 payable in four instalments. By June, the contractor had cashed $45,000. The frame stands open to the weather, a blue tarp doing duty for the back wall, and the crew hasn’t been back in three weeks. Calls go straight to voicemail. A neighbour says he saw the truck on another job site, over in Aylmer. The family wonders what to do: wait it out? Bring in another contractor and risk being sued? Cancel everything? This all-too-common situation engages a handful of rules from the Code civil du Québec, Quebec’s Civil Code, that are worth knowing before you act — because the order of your moves matters as much as the moves themselves.

Step one: put the debtor in default

Under Quebec civil law, you cannot exercise your remedies against someone who is not “in default” (en demeure) — the formal, legal state of being officially late in performing an obligation.

A debtor can be put in default in four ways: through the terms of the contract itself, where it provides that the mere lapse of time will have that effect; through an extrajudicial demand by the creditor; through legal proceedings; or by operation of law alone (article 1594 C.c.Q.).

That last route — default by operation of law — is invaluable on an abandoned site. A debtor falls into this category when the obligation could only be usefully performed within a certain time that has been allowed to lapse, when there was urgency, when the debtor’s own fault made specific performance impossible, or when the debtor has clearly shown an intention not to perform (article 1597 C.c.Q.). A contractor who states in writing that he isn’t coming back is in default without any further step.

Here’s the catch: default by operation of law still has to be argued, and that argument sometimes fails. A written formal notice, giving a period reasonable in light of the nature of the obligation and the circumstances, costs a lot less than a three-hour debate over the point. Send it, keep proof it was sent, and set a realistic deadline — a few days to resume work, not a few hours.

The range of remedies under article 1590

Once default is established, the creditor may, without giving up a claim for damages: force specific performance of the obligation; obtain the resolution or resiliation of the contract, or a reduction of his own obligation; or take any other measure provided by law (article 1590 C.c.Q.).

Specific performance means getting the thing you were promised, not a cheque. Contrary to popular belief, it is the rule, not the exception, in Quebec law. It takes two forms. A court can order the contractor to finish the work — rarely sought, since you can’t force someone to do good work in your home. Or, far more useful, the creditor can have the obligation carried out by a third party, at the debtor’s expense, once the debtor has been put in default (article 1602 C.c.Q.). That’s the normal route: get two or three quotes, have the job finished, and claim the difference.

Resolution or resiliation — retroactive or prospective termination of the contract — is the other main avenue: a creditor who does not seek specific performance is entitled to have the contract resolved, or, for a contract involving successive performance, resiliated (article 1604 C.c.Q.). One crucial nuance: this right does not exist where the debtor’s default is of minor importance, unless it is repeated in a contract involving successive performance; the creditor is then entitled only to a proportional reduction of his own obligation. A badly installed baseboard does not justify cancelling a $78,000 contract; it justifies withholding the value of the deficient work.

Terminating the contract yourself: allowed, but risky

Do you need a judgment to end the contract? No. “The resolution or resiliation of a contract may take place without judicial proceedings where the debtor is in default by operation of law to perform his obligation, or has failed to perform it within the time allowed in a notice of default” (article 1605 C.c.Q.).

That’s powerful, and dangerous. You become the judge of your own case. If a court later finds that the default was minor, that your deadline was unreasonable, or that the debtor was never truly in default, you become the party in breach — with the damages that come with it. Case law is full of owners who fired a contractor too fast and ended up paying for it.

When in doubt, document everything: dated photos, a site log, written exchanges, a building expert’s report on progress and deficiencies. That file will be worth its weight in gold six months later.

Withholding payment, the penalty clause, and mitigating your damages

The exception for non-performance lets you suspend your own performance: where the obligations under a contract are due and one party fails to substantially perform, or does not offer to perform, the other party may, to a corresponding extent, refuse to perform his own correlative obligation (article 1591 C.c.Q.). So you can withhold the third instalment — but only “to a corresponding extent”: holding back $45,000 over a $5,000 deficiency puts you in the wrong.

A penalty clause sets damages in advance for a default, often as an amount per day of delay. Its advantage: you can claim it without proving actual injury. Its limit: a court can reduce the amount if it is abusive, and you cannot claim both the penalty and specific performance together, unless the penalty is meant only to cover the delay (articles 1622 and 1623 C.c.Q.).

Finally, an obligation that surprises many clients: “A person bound to make reparation for injury is not liable for any aggravation of the injury that the victim could have avoided” (article 1479 C.c.Q.). You have a duty to mitigate your damages. Leaving a wall open all winter “so the judge can see how bad it is” is the surest way to get your compensation reduced. Secure the site, protect it, carry out urgent repairs, and keep every invoice.

Force majeure: a stricter bar than people think

It’s the favourite argument of a debtor in trouble. “Superior force is an unforeseeable and irresistible event, including an external cause with the same characteristics”, and a debtor who proves it is released from liability, unless he has undertaken to make reparation regardless (article 1470 C.c.Q.).

Both conditions are cumulative and strict. Unforeseeable at the time the contract was made: a materials shortage that had been in the news for six months does not qualify. Irresistible: performance must have become impossible for anyone in the same position, not merely more costly or less profitable. Post-pandemic disputes drove the point home; Quebec courts have generally set the bar high, refusing to treat rising prices, supply-chain trouble, or a labour shortage as superior force, even though some legal scholars argued for a more flexible reading of obligations that had become excessively burdensome. Unlike some other legal systems, Quebec has no general doctrine excusing a party simply because performance became a much worse deal than expected.

So the real issue is often contractual: your contract’s own force majeure clause can broaden or narrow the legal definition. Read it before you sign, not after.

Key takeaways

Before pursuing any remedy, make sure the debtor is in default: through the contract, a written formal notice, or by operation of law.
Specific performance is the rule; having a third party finish the work at the debtor’s expense is often the most effective solution.
Resolution isn’t available for a minor default: you’ll instead be entitled to a proportional reduction of the price.
Terminating the contract yourself without a judgment is allowed, but you bear the risk: document everything before you act.
You can suspend your payment, but only to an extent proportional to the default.
Mitigate your damages and keep your invoices: avoidable aggravation of the loss is not compensated.

Noise, Smoke, Mould: When a Rental Becomes Unlivable

William Desrochers — Wed, 28 Oct 2026 14:58:15 +0000

Your remedies as a tenant when the peaceful enjoyment of the premises is nothing more than words in the lease.

For eight months, Sophie has not been able to sleep in her apartment in Vieux-Gatineau. The upstairs neighbour comes home at two in the morning, turns on his music, drags furniture around. The smell of smoke seeps through the baseboard heater in her bedroom. She has raised it three times with her landlord, who shrugs: “I’m not the one making noise.” And now a brownish stain is spreading in the corner of the bathroom. Sophie is thinking of withholding her rent to get heard. That would be the worst possible decision. Here is what the law offers her instead.

What the landlord owes you: peaceful enjoyment

The landlord’s central obligation fits in one sentence: he must provide you with peaceful enjoyment of the dwelling for the entire term of the lease (article 1854 of the Code civil du Québec, Quebec’s Civil Code), and deliver a dwelling in good habitable condition (article 1910 C.c.Q.). Peaceful enjoyment, in everyday terms, is the right to feel at home: to sleep, work and have guests without being disturbed beyond reason.

It is not a guarantee of absolute silence: an apartment building comes with normal sounds — footsteps, a door, a child. The law sanctions the disturbance that goes beyond what a reasonable neighbour should have to put up with, and that persists.

The landlord is not responsible for everything: he does not answer for a disturbance caused by a complete stranger (article 1859 C.c.Q.). But as soon as the troublemaker is another tenant of the same building, the picture changes.

The noisy neighbour, smoke and cannabis

Every tenant must behave so as not to disturb the normal enjoyment of the other tenants (article 1860 C.c.Q.). If he fails to, the landlord may apply to have his lease terminated.

And what about you, disturbed by a neighbour in the building? Article 1861 C.c.Q. is your best tool. You must first report the disturbance to the common landlord. If it persists, you may obtain, depending on the circumstances, a reduction of rent or the termination of the lease. You may also recover damages from the landlord, unless he proves that he acted with prudence and diligence. That is the heart of the regime: a landlord who sits on his hands answers for the disturbance; one who sends a formal notice, documents the situation and sues the offending tenant protects himself.

Smoke follows the same logic. Nothing prevents a landlord from including a “no smoking” clause in a new lease. During the lease, he must go through a notice of modification at renewal. One historical exception is worth recalling, because it explains many leases still in force: section 107 of the Loi encadrant le cannabis allowed landlords, between October 17, 2018 and January 15, 2019 only, to unilaterally add a ban on smoking cannabis to an existing lease. The tenant could refuse only for medical reasons, within 30 days; absent a refusal, the ban was deemed written into the lease. That window closed long ago, but the clauses it created remain valid.

It is also prohibited to smoke cannabis in the common areas of buildings with two or more dwellings, on pain of a fine. And even a tenant who is allowed to smoke at home remains bound not to disturb his neighbours, medical cannabis included. A real debate persists before the Tribunal administratif du logement (TAL), Quebec’s rental board: how far does the right to privacy in one’s own home yield to the neighbour’s comfort? It is always a question of degree and of evidence.

Major work: the notice, the evacuation and the indemnity

A non-urgent major repair or improvement cannot begin until the landlord has given you notice (article 1922 C.c.Q.). The notice must state the nature of the work, its start date, its estimated duration, the evacuation period if any, the indemnity offered and any other conditions likely to seriously reduce your enjoyment of the premises (article 1923 C.c.Q.).

The time limits: at least 10 days before the work begins, or three months before an evacuation of more than one week.

If a temporary evacuation is requested, you have 10 days to accept or refuse. Your silence counts as a refusal, and it is then up to the landlord to apply to the Tribunal within 10 days; there, he must show that the work, the conditions and the need to evacuate are reasonable (article 1928 C.c.Q.). If you accept the evacuation but consider some conditions abusive, it is up to you to apply to the Tribunal within 10 days. The application is heard urgently and suspends the work, unless otherwise decided.

Two frequent traps: the landlord cannot raise the rent mid-lease on account of the work, and he must carry it out between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m., unless otherwise agreed. Outside an emergency, 24 hours’ notice is required before any visit or intervention (article 1931 C.c.Q.).

Mould and unfit dwellings: the strong remedies

A dwelling is unfit for habitation when its condition poses a serious threat to the health or safety of the occupants or the public, or when it has been declared so by a court or the competent authority — a municipal inspector, for example (article 1913 C.c.Q.). A serious infestation or a documented fungal contamination can lead there.

Two powerful remedies then open up. You may abandon the dwelling, provided you notify the landlord of its condition before leaving or within the following 10 days; you are then relieved of paying rent for the period during which the dwelling is unfit, unless its condition results from your own fault (article 1915 C.c.Q.). And either party may apply for termination of the lease (article 1972 C.c.Q.).

A word of caution: expert evidence is king. A professional’s report or a municipal inspection notice carries infinitely more weight than a photo taken on a cellphone.

The way forward: document, send a formal notice, apply

First reflex, and the most important: never stop paying your rent. A tenant who withholds rent puts himself in default and exposes himself to termination. The law provides a way out instead: asking the Tribunal for permission to deposit the rent with the Tribunal, on 10 days’ notice to the landlord stating the reason (article 1907 C.c.Q.).

Next, keep a logbook: date, time, duration, nature of the disturbance. Add recordings, photos and the names of witnesses willing to attend the hearing. No evidence, no case.

Then send a written formal notice (mise en demeure), describing the problem, making a specific demand and allowing a reasonable time to comply — ten days is generally considered sufficient. Send it by a means that leaves a trace: bailiff, registered mail, or email with acknowledgment of receipt. Keep a copy.

Finally, file an application with the Tribunal. Depending on what you claim, your file will be classified differently: an order compelling the landlord to perform his obligations is treated as an urgent case, termination of the lease as a priority case, a simple claim for damages or a rent reduction as a general case. A file that clearly alleges a risk to health or safety is systematically placed in the urgent category: so draft your grounds with care.

A final word on harassment. No one may harass a tenant in such a way as to limit his peaceful enjoyment of the premises or to induce him to leave the dwelling (article 1902 C.c.Q.). Abusive visits, cut-off services, intimidation, work deliberately dragged out: the harassed tenant may claim punitive damages on top of ordinary compensation. Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms also allows them in cases of unlawful and intentional interference.

Key takeaways

The landlord must provide you with peaceful enjoyment of the premises; when the disturbance comes from another tenant, he must step in.
Report the disturbance in writing before anything else: it is the gateway to your remedies.
Never stop paying your rent; instead, ask for permission to deposit it with the Tribunal.
For major work, insist on the full notice: 10 days, or three months if the evacuation exceeds one week.
Document everything — logbook, photos, witnesses, expert report — then send a formal notice with a ten-day deadline.
Your remedies add up: rent reduction, damages, termination and, in cases of harassment, punitive damages.

Rent Increase: How to Refuse It, Negotiate It or Contest It

William Desrochers — Sat, 24 Oct 2026 04:07:54 +0000

Receiving a notice of increase does not mean you have to pay it — here are the deadlines, the remedies and the numbers you need to know.

Julie has rented the same two-bedroom apartment in the Hull sector for six years. One February morning, she finds a letter from her landlord in the mailbox: the rent will go from $1,050 to $1,175 on July 1st. Discouraged, she calls a friend, who tells her that “there’s nothing you can do anyway.” She puts the letter in a drawer. Six weeks later, she learns that by not replying, she accepted the full increase. It is the most common scenario, and the most avoidable. Refusing a rent increase in Quebec is neither complicated nor risky, provided you do it in writing and on time.

The notice of modification: tight deadlines and mandatory content

A residential lease renews automatically at its term, on the same conditions (article 1941 of the Code civil du Québec, Quebec’s Civil Code). To change anything — the rent, the term, any other condition — the landlord must send you a notice of modification of the lease within a precise window (article 1942 C.c.Q.):

lease of 12 months or more: between 3 and 6 months before the end of the lease;
lease of less than 12 months: between 1 and 2 months before the end of the lease;
lease with an indeterminate term: between 1 and 2 months before the proposed modification;
lease of a room: between 10 and 20 days.

The notice must be in writing and clearly state the requested change. For an increase, three formats are allowed: the new rent in dollars, the increase in dollars, or a percentage of the current rent.

Since December 26, 2024, article 1943 C.c.Q., as amended by the Loi limitant le droit d’éviction des locateurs et renforçant la protection des locataires aînés, requires more: the notice must inform the tenant of his rights and remedies and reproduce the text prescribed by the Regulation respecting the mandatory content of a notice of modification of the lease of a dwelling. Since January 1, 2026, it must also specify, where applicable, the portion of the increase attributable to services tied to the tenant personally, a rule aimed mainly at private seniors’ residences. The Tribunal administratif du logement (TAL), Quebec’s rental board, publishes a model notice that already contains these statements.

The trap: a defective or late notice can be set aside, but beware of false good news. Without a valid notice, the lease renews on its previous conditions; you do not thereby gain a right to leave.

Refusing: one month to reply, and the trap of silence

Once you receive the notice, you have one month to inform your landlord either that you refuse the modification or that you are leaving the dwelling (article 1945 C.c.Q.). A notice received on January 15 must therefore be answered no later than February 15.

If you do nothing, you are deemed to have accepted the renewal of the lease on the proposed conditions, increase included. That is exactly what happened to Julie. Silence is not neutral: it amounts to consent.

There is no magic formula for refusing: a simple letter — “I refuse the proposed increase and I am staying in the dwelling” — is enough, and the TAL publishes a model. What matters is proof of receipt: registered mail, hand delivery with acknowledgment, or a confirmed email. Keep a copy.

Refusing is not leaving. The lease renews and you stay in your home. It is then up to the landlord to act: he has one month from receipt of your refusal to ask the Tribunal to fix the rent (article 1947 C.c.Q., as amended by Bill 31 in 2024). If he lets that deadline pass, the lease is renewed by operation of law at the previous rent. In practice, many landlords would rather negotiate than wait several months for a hearing.

The application to fix rent: what the Tribunal really looks at

The Tribunal does not fix rent by gut feeling: it applies the standards of the Regulation respecting the criteria for the fixing of rent, revised as of January 1, 2026 (article 1953 C.c.Q.). The criteria are, in essence, a base percentage applied to the rent, the change in municipal and school property taxes, the change in fire and liability insurance premiums, a 5% rate applied to capital expenditures of the reference year, and expenses related to adding a service or an accessory. The base percentage is derived from the three-year average change in Quebec’s consumer price index.

The figures published by the TAL for notices given on or after January 1, 2026 are a base percentage of 3.1% for rent (down from 4.5% the previous year), 6.7% for the portion of rent tied to services provided to the tenant personally, and 5% for capital expenditures. The Tribunal offers a free online calculation tool that lets you estimate the justified increase yourself by entering taxes, insurance and work done. It is the most useful tool for discussing matters with your landlord, with figures in hand rather than impressions.

This overhaul is not unanimously welcomed: landlord associations consider the return on buildings undervalued, while tenant groups fault the Quebec regime for remaining a “case-by-case” control, hinging on each tenant’s refusal rather than on a general cap.

The trap here is real. Before the Tribunal, the landlord is no longer bound by the amount stated in his notice: he may claim the increase calculated under the regulation, which could exceed what he originally asked for. So weigh the file seriously before refusing an increase that is already modest. Conversely, in 2024-2025, the average wait for a first hearing on a rent-fixing application was close to nine months: that slowness weighs on both sides.

Clause F: when you have no right to contest

There is one important exception. Article 1955 C.c.Q. denies both parties the right to apply for rent fixing during the five years following the date on which a newly built building — or one newly converted to rental use — is ready for its intended use. The same rule applies to a dwelling rented by a housing cooperative.

This restriction can be invoked against the tenant only if it is written into the lease, in section F of the mandatory form, with the date the building was ready. And since Bill 31, for leases entered into after February 20, 2024 concerning a building ready after that date, the lease must also state the maximum rent the landlord may charge during the five years. If these statements are missing, the restriction does not apply and you keep your right to refuse.

When clause F applies, the consequence is harsh: a tenant who refuses the modification must leave the dwelling at the end of the lease. Before signing a lease in a new building, read that section first.

Another door exists for new tenants: if you pay more than the lowest rent charged in the preceding twelve months, you can have the rent fixed, normally within ten days of signing the lease — or within two months if the landlord did not give you the mandatory notice stating the former rent (article 1950 C.c.Q.). That is the well-known section G of the lease, too often left blank.

Key takeaways

Check the date first: the notice must reach you between 3 and 6 months before the end of a lease of 12 months or more.
You have one month to reply. Doing nothing amounts to accepting the full increase.
Refusing in writing, with proof of receipt, does not force you to move: the lease renews and you stay.
If the landlord does not apply to the Tribunal within the month following your refusal, the lease renews at the previous rent.
Use the TAL’s calculation tool: before the Tribunal, the rent fixed may exceed the increase that was requested.
If section F of the lease is checked and validly completed for a building five years old or less, refusing means leaving the dwelling.

Virtulex Avocats

Leased farmland, work done without a signed agreement: a farmer claims $300,000 and walks away empty-handed

The facts: a one-year lease and negotiations that ran out of steam

Negotiating is not concluding

No fault on the Régie’s part

The improvements stay with the owner

One more hurdle: who actually paid?

Why this decision stands out

Key takeaways

Further reading

Mareva injunction vs. taking in payment: when the hypothecary lender goes ahead of the investors

The facts: a building, a hypothec and worried investors

Two concepts to understand

The conditions for revocation at the request of a third person

No prior notice owed to the beneficiaries of a Mareva

Why this decision stands out

Key takeaways

Further reading

Divorced in the UAE, still fighting in Quebec: who decides support and property division?

The facts: a marriage in the Emirates, a breakdown in Quebec

Can a court’s jurisdiction be challenged after four years?

Do the Quebec courts have jurisdiction?

Forum non conveniens: sending the case back to the Emirates?

Which law applies? A three-part answer

Why this decision stands out

Key takeaways

Further reading

“Just a formality”: an 84-year-old tenant did not give up her lease by signing the new owner’s paper

The facts: a document signed in a hurry

A telling admission at the hearing

Residential lease rules protect tenants, even from themselves

Why this decision stands out

Key takeaways

Further reading

Small claims: your claim can lapse without you knowing it — a Gatineau judge sounds the alarm

The facts: fifteen months without service

Three months to serve, or the claim lapses

Why the court office could not act in the plaintiff’s place

Why this decision stands out

Key takeaways

Further reading

Married for papers? Why the Court refused to annul a marriage after nine years of living together

The facts: love at first sight in the sun, then disillusionment

Annulling a marriage is not the same as divorcing

The three-year limit, and its exception

The heart of the case: proving intention at the time of the marriage

Even if proven, the nullity would have been “confirmed”

Why this decision stands out

Key takeaways

Further reading

Cancelling a Contract in Québec: The Real Cooling-Off Periods

The myth of the universal cooling-off period

The time limits the LPC actually provides, case by case

Instalment sales: when the merchant wants the goods back

When no time limit applies: a defect in consent

The legal warranty, durability, and what Bill 29 added

Key takeaways

Further reading

Abandoned Construction Site: Your Remedies When a Contract Is Not Honoured

Step one: put the debtor in default

The range of remedies under article 1590

Terminating the contract yourself: allowed, but risky

Withholding payment, the penalty clause, and mitigating your damages

Force majeure: a stricter bar than people think

Key takeaways

Further reading

Noise, Smoke, Mould: When a Rental Becomes Unlivable

What the landlord owes you: peaceful enjoyment

The noisy neighbour, smoke and cannabis

Major work: the notice, the evacuation and the indemnity

Mould and unfit dwellings: the strong remedies

The way forward: document, send a formal notice, apply

Key takeaways

Further reading

Rent Increase: How to Refuse It, Negotiate It or Contest It

The notice of modification: tight deadlines and mandatory content

Refusing: one month to reply, and the trap of silence

The application to fix rent: what the Tribunal really looks at

Clause F: when you have no right to contest

Key takeaways