{"id":23348,"date":"2026-10-14T09:51:30","date_gmt":"2026-10-14T13:51:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.virtulexavocats.com\/?p=23348"},"modified":"2026-10-14T09:51:53","modified_gmt":"2026-10-14T13:51:53","slug":"written-decision-contradicts-hearing-rental-tribunal-lease-termination","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.virtulexavocats.com\/en\/written-decision-contradicts-hearing-rental-tribunal-lease-termination\/","title":{"rendered":"“I Am Not Going to Terminate the Lease”: When the Written Decision Contradicts What the Judge Said at the Hearing"},"content":{"rendered":"

An administrative judge announces at the hearing that she will not terminate the lease. Six weeks later, her written decision evicts the tenant. The Court of Qu\u00e9bec has just confirmed that a tribunal cannot go back on its word.<\/em><\/p>\n

On 28 November 2024, in the judicial district of Longueuil, a tenant walks out of his hearing before the Tribunal administratif du logement (Qu\u00e9bec’s rental tribunal, known as the TAL) believing he has good news. The administrative judge has just told him, word for word: “I am not going to terminate the lease. I cannot, with what you wrote.” He will keep his apartment, provided he pays his rent on the first of each month. He leaves the room.<\/p>\n

On 9 January 2025, he receives a written decision in the mail terminating his lease and ordering his eviction.<\/p>\n

That contradiction lies at the heart of Matey c. Pierre-Louis<\/em>, rendered on 31 July 2026 by the Honourable H\u00e9l\u00e8ne Maillette of the Court of Qu\u00e9bec (administrative and appeal division), district of Longueuil. The judgment is short, but it touches something fundamental: a tribunal’s word.<\/p>\n

A lease, some late payments, and a text message that changes everything<\/h2>\n

The parties were bound by a lease running from 1 February 2024 to 31 January 2025, at $1,000 per month payable on the first day of each month.<\/p>\n

The landlord applied to the TAL for termination of the lease, eviction of the tenant and recovery of unpaid rent, with provisional execution notwithstanding appeal. She added a second ground: frequent late payment of rent.<\/p>\n

Before the hearing, the tenant paid all the rent owing. That left only the question of frequent lateness. The tenant admitted being late, but produced a text message from the landlord dated 1 February 2024, which reads (in translation, spelling errors and all):<\/p>\n

“Good evening m. Matey (\u2026). Although often late you pay me every month no problem on that side. (\u2026). So do your best for me. Its always better to get along without a fight (\u2026)”<\/p>\n

Frequent lateness: the law requires serious prejudice<\/h2>\n

A short legal detour, in plain language. In Qu\u00e9bec, a residential tenant enjoys a right to maintain occupancy<\/strong> (droit au maintien dans les lieux<\/em>). Article 1936 of the Civil Code of Qu\u00e9bec<\/em> provides that “every lessee has a personal right to maintain occupancy; he may not be evicted from the leased dwelling except in the cases provided for by law.” In other words, you do not put a tenant out simply because you would like to: you need a ground set out in the law.<\/p>\n

Late rent is one of those grounds, but a qualified one. Article 1971 C.C.Q. provides that the lessor may obtain termination of the lease if the lessee is over three weeks late in paying rent or, alternatively, if the lessor suffers serious prejudice as a result of the lessee’s frequent late payments.<\/p>\n

The distinction is crucial. For a delay of more than three weeks, lateness alone is enough. For frequent<\/em> lateness, the landlord must also prove serious prejudice<\/strong>. And that is precisely where the text message hurts: it is hard to argue serious prejudice when you yourself wrote “no problem on that side.”<\/p>\n

The administrative judge saw this clearly. She told the parties she could not ignore that the landlord had allowed the delays “in a burst of generosity,” and that she could not find “serious prejudice” in the face of a written statement from the landlord saying, as to the delays, “no problem.”<\/p>\n

What the judge said from the bench<\/h2>\n

The official transcript of the hearing is unequivocal:<\/p>\n

“So, I am going to make an order against you. I am not going to terminate the lease. I cannot, with what you wrote. All right? But I am still going to make an order against you requiring you to pay on the first of each month.”<\/p>\n

She then explained the consequences of any breach: one day late, one dollar short, and that is a violation of the order, which triggers automatic termination of the lease.<\/p>\n

This approach reflects article 1973 C.C.Q., which allows the tribunal, instead of terminating immediately, to order the debtor to perform his obligations: “If the debtor does not comply with the decision of the court, the court shall, on the application of the creditor, terminate the lease.” It is, in substance, a structured last chance.<\/p>\n

The judge then closed the hearing: “Fine. So you will receive my decision in the mail. [\u2026]”<\/p>\n

What happened after the tenant left<\/h2>\n

The appeal judgment is instructive because the Court of Qu\u00e9bec did what should be done: it read the transcript and<\/em> listened to the complete audio recording of the hearing.<\/p>\n

We learn that, immediately after the announcement that the decision would follow by mail, the tenant left the room. The landlord stayed. She continued to insist that she wanted the tenant out, that she was under stress, that her heart was going to stop, that she was not living and not sleeping. Her son, who accompanied her and had to return abroad, asked whether his mother’s condition would be taken into account. The administrative judge answered: “I will think about it.” The last sentence of the transcript is spoken by the landlord: “I am going to die.”<\/p>\n

There is more. On 3 December 2024 \u2014 during deliberation \u2014 the landlord sent the administrative judge a letter, copied to the tenant, accusing him of having made statements at the hearing that were “untruthful, vexatious and shocking” toward her, and reiterating “respectfully and firmly” her request for termination of the lease.<\/p>\n

The Court of Qu\u00e9bec asks the question openly: did the administrative judge forget what she had said? Did she regret her announcement in the face of the landlord’s distress? Did she change her mind upon reading the letter received during deliberation? And it answers, sensibly, that the scenario hardly matters: the result is the same.<\/p>\n

Why this is an error of law, not a matter of appreciation<\/h2>\n

On appeal, everything turns on the nature of the question. A question of law is reviewed on the standard of correctness<\/strong> \u2014 the appellate court may substitute its own answer. A question of fact, or of mixed fact and law, requires a palpable and overriding error<\/strong>, a far more demanding threshold.<\/p>\n

The Court concludes that a judge who decides in writing the opposite of what she has already decided orally raises “a question of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole.” It relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Vavilov<\/em>, and draws a parallel with other procedural failings, such as ruling beyond what was requested (ultra petita<\/em>).<\/p>\n

The most interesting reasoning lies elsewhere. The statute governing the TAL contains no equivalent to the second paragraph of article 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure<\/em>, which provides that where a judgment rendered at the hearing is transcribed, “the disposition of the judgment may not be modified, but the judge may correct its form.” Because the Code of Civil Procedure applies suppletively \u2014 it fills gaps \u2014 the Court applies that rule to the TAL.<\/p>\n

The conclusion follows: the administrative judge did not merely “think out loud during the hearing”; she clearly announced her decision, from the bench, to dismiss the termination, and even explained its practical implications. She could not afterward decide the opposite. The Court relies in particular on a Superior Court decision sitting in appeal in youth protection matters, where it was held that the judgment pronounced from the bench must prevail over a later, divergent written version.<\/p>\n

Result: the appeal is allowed, the TAL decision is set aside, and the Court confirms the tenant’s right to maintain occupancy \u2014 subject, it specifies, to any other cause of action arising after the hearing of 28 November 2024. He must pay his rent on the first day of each month: exactly what had been announced at the hearing. All of it without costs.<\/p>\n

Why this case stands out<\/h2>\n

First, because it is human on both sides. The landlord is not a faceless speculator: she is an elderly, retired woman, visibly at the end of her rope. The tenant had paid all his rent and had relied on a written statement from his own landlord. There is no villain here, only a process that went off the rails.<\/p>\n

Second, because it touches something litigants feel viscerally: trust in what a tribunal says. When a decision-maker announces an outcome at the hearing, the parties organize their lives around it. Had he known, the tenant might have contested differently, produced other evidence, or simply started looking for another apartment in a tight rental market.<\/p>\n

Third, because it illustrates a real risk during deliberation: unilateral communication. A party who writes to the tribunal after the hearing, even with a copy to the other side, places the decision-maker in a delicate position. Here, doubt lingers, and the Court of Qu\u00e9bec does not dispel it \u2014 it prudently says that whatever the explanation, the result is tainted.<\/p>\n

One nuance is called for, in fairness. It could be argued that, until judgment is signed, a decision-maker remains master of the deliberation and may change her mind, especially if she realizes she was about to err. That is a serious argument, and one could add that the TAL’s own statute contains no equivalent to article 334 C.C.P. The Court responds by recalling the suppletive character of the Code of Civil Procedure, and by distinguishing thinking out loud from a decision announced: here, the judge did not explore a hypothesis, she decided, explained and warned. It is that definitive character, established by a transcript certified by an official court reporter, that makes the difference.<\/p>\n

Key takeaways<\/h2>\n

For tenants.<\/strong> If a written decision contradicts what the tribunal announced at the hearing, that is not normal, and it is not without remedy. But you must act fast: in housing matters, appeal deadlines are short. Order the transcript and, if possible, the audio recording of the hearing \u2014 that is exactly what saved this tenant.<\/p>\n

For landlords.<\/strong> Be careful what you write to your tenants. A kind text message about late payments can become, a year later, the very exhibit that defeats your application for termination. This does not mean burying your head in the sand or being inhuman \u2014 but it is far better to write “I am accepting a late payment this month as an exception” than “no problem on that side.”<\/p>\n

For everyone.<\/strong> Do not write to the judge during deliberation. Once the hearing ends, the file belongs to the tribunal. Adding a letter, however sincere, and even with a copy to the other party, adds nothing valid to the evidence and may well undermine the very decision you are hoping for. If something genuinely new and important arises, the proper route is a motion to reopen the hearing, with the other party duly notified.<\/p>\n

And a broader lesson.<\/strong> Transcribing hearings is not a procedural luxury. In this file, without the transcript and the audio, there would have been nothing but a tenant’s word against a signed written decision. When the stakes are serious \u2014 and losing your home is serious \u2014 proof of what was actually said at the hearing is worth its weight in gold.<\/p>\n

Related reading<\/h2>\n