{"id":23270,"date":"2026-09-30T08:05:25","date_gmt":"2026-09-30T12:05:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.virtulexavocats.com\/?p=23270"},"modified":"2026-09-30T08:06:05","modified_gmt":"2026-09-30T12:06:05","slug":"seniors-residence-mandatory-services-housekeeping-court-of-quebec","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.virtulexavocats.com\/en\/seniors-residence-mandatory-services-housekeeping-court-of-quebec\/","title":{"rendered":"“Mandatory Services” in Seniors’ Residences: The Court of Qu\u00e9bec Gives Tenants Back Their Choice"},"content":{"rendered":"

Imposed housekeeping and linen service, a surcharge for a second occupant, a “house” form in place of the mandatory one: the Court of Qu\u00e9bec overturns the Tribunal administratif du logement and reminds private seniors’ residences that they cannot rewrite the Civil Code in their favour.<\/em><\/p>\n

A man moves into a private seniors’ residence in Sainte-Julie with his wife. He is independent and prefers to do his own housekeeping and wash his own bedding. But his lease forces both services on him, for a little over $100 a month, with an unmistakable note in the residence’s service grid: “mandatory in the rent” and “the tenant cannot remove these services.” He is also charged an extra $75 a month because his wife lives with him. Five months after moving in, he writes to the residence to cancel the housekeeping and linen services. Refused. He turns to the Tribunal administratif du logement (the “TAL”, Qu\u00e9bec’s rental tribunal), which essentially tells him that this is not its business and that he should complain to the health network’s Complaints Commissioner instead.<\/p>\n

Three years later, the Court of Qu\u00e9bec sides with him on the essentials in Pettigrew c. 6985467 Canada inc. (R\u00e9sidences Soleil Manoir Sainte-Julie)<\/em>, 2026 QCCQ 3582, rendered on August 10, 2026 by the Honourable Daniel L\u00e9vesque. The Court overturns the TAL’s decision, finds the disputed clauses null, and orders the residence to reimburse more than $8,500. The judgment quickly made headlines: it is the first time the Court of Qu\u00e9bec has ruled on the supposed “permanence” of services included in a seniors’ residence lease.<\/p>\n

The facts in brief<\/h2>\n

The lease was signed on March 3, 2022, took effect on July 1, 2022, and has renewed yearly since. The landlord operates a private seniors’ residence (a “RPA”, for r\u00e9sidence priv\u00e9e pour a\u00een\u00e9s<\/em>): a rental building intended mainly for people 65 and over, which offers various services on top of housing (meals, security, personal assistance, housekeeping). To use that designation, a RPA must hold a government certification that requires it to offer certain services depending on its category.<\/p>\n

Rather than relying solely on the mandatory form prescribed by law (the “Schedule 6” of the regulation on mandatory lease forms), the residence attached its own “service grid” to the lease. That in-house grid is where the linen service (once a week) and housekeeping (twice a month) were declared mandatory, and where the $75 surcharge for a second occupant appeared.<\/p>\n

On December 12, 2022, Mr. Pettigrew notified the residence in writing that he no longer wanted the two services. The residence kept billing them. The tenant filed with the TAL in May 2023. On October 14, 2025, the TAL dismissed all of his claims. He obtained leave to appeal to the Court of Qu\u00e9bec in June 2026.<\/p>\n

First error: the TAL could not decline jurisdiction<\/h2>\n

The TAL had concluded that it could only assess whether the services were properly delivered, not whether the residence was entitled to make them mandatory. For that, it referred the tenant to the Complaints Commissioner and the Health Services Ombudsman.<\/p>\n

The Court of Qu\u00e9bec sees a fundamental error of law. Those bodies have no binding authority: they issue recommendations that the institution is free to follow or ignore. They cannot condemn anyone or order a refund. Sending the tenant to them leaves him with no forum capable of actually deciding his dispute. Judge L\u00e9vesque describes a “jurisdictional vacuum” that “in itself constitutes a denial of justice.”<\/p>\n

The TAL’s jurisdiction is, in any event, very broad: it hears, to the exclusion of any other court, every application relating to the lease of a dwelling, and the Civil Code specifies that its rules also govern “services offered by the lessor which relate to the person of the lessee.” Housekeeping and linen services written into a RPA lease are precisely that kind of service.<\/p>\n

The judgment pinpoints the source of the confusion: the TAL conflated two distinct relationships. On one side, the residence’s obligations toward the body that certifies it (it must offer<\/em> certain services). On the other, its contract with the tenant. Nothing in the certification regulation says tenants are required to buy<\/em> those services.<\/p>\n

Second error: a service accepted at signing is not frozen for life<\/h2>\n

This is the heart of the judgment. The residence’s theory, implicitly adopted by the TAL: the basket of services agreed at signing “crystallizes” and carries over unchanged at each renewal. The tenant could never reduce it, whatever the evolution of his needs, his satisfaction or his means. His only way out would be to move. The Court rejects that reading for several reasons.<\/p>\n

First, the Court observes that the contract between a resident and a RPA has a dual nature: it is a lease, but it is also, in practice, a contract for services under the Civil Code. One of the essential features of a contract for services is that the client may terminate it unilaterally, without having to prove fault or give reasons (article 2125 of the Civil Code of Qu\u00e9bec). Such a characterization would therefore carry an important consequence, and nothing in the Code clearly excludes the “services” portion of a RPA lease from that rule.<\/p>\n

Second, and this is the main basis of the decision, article 1900 of the Civil Code declares “without effect” any clause limiting the tenant’s right “to purchase property or obtain services from such persons as he chooses, and on such terms and conditions as he sees fit.” A clause forcing a tenant to receive housekeeping and linen service from his residence and no one else, including himself or a family member, limits exactly that right. It is therefore null as soon as the tenant invokes it.<\/p>\n

The judge adds a consideration rarely stated so plainly in housing matters: RPA services touch “the most intimate aspects of daily life.” Dissatisfaction with housekeeping, meals or personal hygiene care is often subjective and hard to prove, yet it genuinely affects a person’s dignity and autonomy. Depriving a senior of the right to decide these matters for all the years of a lease could, in the Court’s view, reinforce a sense of powerlessness tied to what legal scholars describe as the infantilization of older adults. The Court anchors its analysis in section 48 of Qu\u00e9bec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which protects every aged person against exploitation.<\/p>\n

Finally, the Court relies on a clear signal from the legislature. Since December 15, 2022, the regulation on the certification of private seniors’ residences expressly prohibits an operator from requiring that a service be taken as a condition of signing a lease: the choice of services must be left “entirely to the discretion” of the person. Because it came into force after Mr. Pettigrew’s lease was signed, the regulation does not apply retroactively to his case, but it repudiates the argument, sometimes accepted by the TAL, that a residence’s profitability justifies imposing services.<\/p>\n

Result: the tenant was entitled to stop receiving those services as of January 1, 2023. The residence must reimburse $5,059.62 collected from that date until April 30, 2026, plus whatever was collected afterward, with interest.<\/p>\n

Third error: the mandatory form is not a technicality<\/h2>\n

The law requires any landlord offering services related to the person of the tenant to complete a specific form (Schedule 6) showing the cost of each service and the total rent. The TAL had held that insisting on this form, when the residence’s in-house grid contained the essentials, amounted to “excessive formalism.”<\/p>\n

The Court disagrees. The residential lease is one of the rare contracts for which the legislature imposes a complete, mandatory form, precisely so that the information is clear and uniform. The case shows why: the official form has no box for declaring a service “mandatory.” It was the in-house grid that made it possible to add that mention, blurring the line between services included in the base rent and those related to the person. And that line matters: in certain situations (permanent admission to a long-term care facility, disability), the law exempts the tenant from paying the “personal services” portion of the rent. The residence must therefore produce a compliant form within 30 days.<\/p>\n

Fourth error: the $75 surcharge for the spouse<\/h2>\n

Article 1900 also renders without effect any clause that changes the tenant’s rights because of an increase in the number of occupants, unless the size of the dwelling justifies it. The TAL had nonetheless upheld the $75 monthly charge: a second occupant uses the services and wears down the equipment, and a “special regime” for RPAs would override the Civil Code. It acknowledged itself that an exception “would certainly deserve to be provided for” in article 1900.<\/p>\n

The Court’s answer is direct: that exception does not exist. Following the TAL’s logic would mean accepting that the rent goes up or down with the comings and goings of the tenant’s wife, exactly what the law forbids. The clause is declared null and the residence must reimburse $3,450, that is, $75 a month from the start of the lease to April 30, 2026, with interest, on top of a reduction of the current rent.<\/p>\n

Why this case stands out<\/h2>\n

The amounts at stake for this tenant are modest. The reach of the judgment is not. A very large number of Qu\u00e9bec seniors live in RPAs, and the “mandatory package” model is unlikely to be unique to this residence. The Court says so itself: the arguments raised “are likely to carry significant consequences for many parties involved in the same type of lease,” and that goes for every type of service, not just housekeeping.<\/p>\n

The judgment is also notable for its tone: beyond the technical analysis, it places the question in the context of aging, dignity and the real balance of power between a senior and the place where he lives.<\/p>\n

In fairness, the residences’ position is not without logic. A RPA must maintain an offer of services to keep its certification, and part of its viability depends on the volume of services sold; some TAL decisions had given weight to that argument. Judge L\u00e9vesque also sets aside, for lack of debate, the effect that including or excluding services from the lease may have on the provincial tax credit for home-support services for seniors. Finally, a Court of Qu\u00e9bec judgment sitting on appeal from the TAL can itself be the subject of an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal; the last word may not have been said.<\/p>\n

What to take away<\/h2>\n

If you live in a RPA, or support a parent who does, keep the following in mind.<\/p>\n

A seniors’ residence lease remains a residential lease. The protections of the Civil Code apply, and the TAL is the proper forum to enforce them, including to challenge the “mandatory” nature of a service. The Complaints Commissioner and the Ombudsman can help, but they cannot order anything.<\/p>\n

For a lease signed since December 15, 2022, the residence cannot require that a service (other than those whose cost is necessarily included in the rent) be taken as a condition of signing. And whatever the date of the lease, article 1900 of the Civil Code remains a powerful tool against clauses that prevent you from obtaining a service from someone else, or from doing it yourself.<\/p>\n

A service you no longer want can, in principle, be removed during the lease. Do it in writing and keep a copy: that letter is what set the starting point of the refund here.<\/p>\n

A surcharge because your spouse lives with you is, in principle, without effect, unless the size of the unit justifies it. Check your service grid.<\/p>\n

Insist on the mandatory form (Schedule 6), fully completed, rather than an in-house grid: it separates services included in the base rent from those related to your person, which matters the day your situation changes. Finally, before removing a service, find out how it may affect your tax credit for home-support services.<\/p>\n

Further reading<\/h2>\n