What a Court of Qu\u00e9bec decision teaches about unpaid condo fees, the quorum of co-owners’ meetings and the choice of the right court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A building on D’Iberville Street in Montreal. Two units, two fractions of a divided co-ownership \u2014 what Quebec law calls copropri\u00e9t\u00e9 divise<\/em>, and what most people simply call a condo \u2014 and two neighbours. On one side, a couple who own one of the fractions and who, between the two of them, make up the entire board of directors of the syndicate (the legal entity that manages the building). On the other, a co-owner who stops paying his share of the common expenses and challenges the very legitimacy of the syndicate’s decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The syndicate eventually brings out the heavy artillery: it asks the court to order the forced surrender and sale under judicial authority of the neighbour’s fraction. In plain language, it asks the court to sell the condo in order to get paid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then, at the very outset of the trial, a twist. The judge raises on his own initiative \u2014 ex officio<\/em>, in legal parlance \u2014 a question neither party had asked: does the Court of Qu\u00e9bec even have the authority to hear this case? On 1 May 2026, in Syndicat de la copropri\u00e9t\u00e9 du 4236-4238 d’Iberville c. Rimane<\/em>, 2026 QCCQ 1828<\/a>, the Honourable Nicholas Daudelin, J.C.Q., answers no and orders the file transferred to the Superior Court. After two days of hearing on 5 and 6 February 2026 and written pleadings, the parties are back to square one \u2014 before a different court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The building contains only two fractions of divided co-ownership. Mr. Laneuville and Ms. Dionne hold one of them jointly; Mr. Rimane holds the other. During the relevant period, the couple alone make up the syndicate’s entire board of directors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The syndicate claims Mr. Rimane’s unpaid condo fees \u2014 his share of the common expenses, the money that keeps the building running. It exercises its hypothecary recourse: Quebec law grants the syndicate a legal hypothec (a statutory security, comparable to a lien or mortgage) over the fraction of a defaulting co-owner (art. 2729 of the Civil Code of Qu\u00e9bec<\/em>). It also claims an indemnity for the professional fees incurred in collecting the debt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mr. Rimane does not merely argue that the amounts are too high. He attacks the root: in his view, the debt never validly came into existence, because the meetings of co-owners were held without a quorum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n His reasoning rests on article 1091 of the Civil Code of Qu\u00e9bec<\/em>. That provision states that, in a co-ownership comprising fewer than five fractions, a co-owner holding more than half of all the votes has his number of votes reduced, at a meeting, to the sum of the votes of the other co-owners present or represented. The legislature’s goal is simple: to prevent a majority co-owner from running the show single-handedly in a small building. Note right away that the Court makes no ruling on whether this provision applies to the facts of the case \u2014 that is precisely the crux of the problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, the quorum of a meeting \u2014 the minimum number of votes required for the meeting to sit validly \u2014 consists of the co-owners holding a majority of the votes (art. 1089 C.C.Q.). If the majority owner’s votes are reduced, Mr. Rimane argues, then it is that reduced number that must be used to calculate the quorum. No quorum, no valid meeting. No valid meeting, no valid election of directors and no valid budget \u2014 and therefore no enforceable common expenses. He himself describes his defence as the equivalent of a direct action in nullity, the decisions being, in his words, \u00ab nulles ab initio \u00bb \u2014 null from the outset.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He adds a long list of subsidiary grounds: legal fees incurred by the couple personally but billed to the syndicate, a claim amount he says is inflated, roofing work already before an arbitrator, expenses benefiting the neighbours’ private portion, constant fluctuations in the balance claimed that prevented him from curing his default, prohibited penalties, and sums already paid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One point deserves emphasis immediately: the Court rules on none of these complaints. It decides a single question, prior to all the others \u2014 which court has the power to decide them?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Court of Qu\u00e9bec is not a court of general jurisdiction. That role belongs to the Superior Court, which has authority by default over everything the legislature has not expressly assigned elsewhere. The Court of Qu\u00e9bec draws its authority from specific texts: in civil matters, article 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure<\/em> gives it disputes concerning contractual and extracontractual obligations, subject to monetary thresholds \u2014 while specifying that it does not exercise that authority where the law formally and exclusively assigns the matter to another court or adjudicative body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Justice Daudelin then turns to article 34 C.C.P., which vests the Superior Court with a general power of judicial review, including over private legal persons. A condominium syndicate is precisely a private legal person. Verifying whether its meetings, elections and budgets were lawfully conducted amounts to reviewing its acts \u2014 an exercise the case law consistently reserves to the Superior Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n That left the question of what the dispute is really about. The Court applies the classic two-step framework: examine the legislative texts, then identify the true nature of the dispute between the parties, regardless of the label the parties attach to their proceedings. Crucially, that nature is not determined from the claim alone. Borrowing a formula from the Superior Court, the judge stresses that a claim cannot be severed from the defence raised against it without distorting and sterilizing the debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The syndicate argued that the Court could simply set the defence aside and rule on the claim. The judge refuses: the defence is inextricably linked to the allegations in the claim. \u00ab Un moyen de d\u00e9fense est la r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 une all\u00e9gation formul\u00e9e dans une demande. Ils doivent \u00eatre entendus ensemble pour que justice soit rendue \u00bb, he writes \u2014 a defence is the answer to an allegation made in a claim, and the two must be heard together for justice to be done. Setting the defence aside would deprive Mr. Rimane of his right to a full and complete defence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A telling detail: it was the syndicate’s own counsel who, at the hearing, summed up the problem by saying that the Court of Qu\u00e9bec would be stepping into the Superior Court’s jurisdiction by ruling on the validity of the argument, and that wading into article 1091 C.C.Q. in such a context raises a jurisdictional issue. The Court agrees with him on that precise point \u2014 while rejecting his conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most practically useful part of the judgment concerns articles 1086.2 and 1103 C.C.Q. These provisions allow a co-owner to ask the court to annul a decision of the board of directors or of the general meeting where it is biased, was taken with intent to injure the co-owners, or was taken in contempt of their rights (article 1103 also covers an error in the counting of votes).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Two distinct requirements apply cumulatively here. First, the co-owner must proceed by action \u2014 a proceeding he institutes himself. He can never simply raise the nullity as a shield when he is sued. Second, he must do so within 90 days, on pain of forfeiture, meaning outright loss of the right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This restrictive framework is no whim: it serves the stability of the co-ownership. The legislature wants to prevent a disgruntled co-owner from paralyzing the building by reopening, years later, decisions already implemented. The practical consequence: where these articles apply, a syndicate suing before the Court of Qu\u00e9bec keeps its forum \u2014 not because the defence was rejected on the merits, but because it simply does not legally form part of the dispute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Except that \u2014 and here is the rub \u2014 the Court sides with Mr. Rimane on one point: a challenge based on the absence of a quorum falls outside the scope of article 1103 C.C.Q., consistent with what the Superior Court held in Gaudette c. Syndicat de la copropri\u00e9t\u00e9 Lauzon<\/em>, 2022 QCCS 3848<\/a>. Neither the obligation to proceed by action nor the 90-day deadline applies. The argument stays alive, it forms part of the dispute\u2026 and it belongs to the Superior Court. The syndicate’s shield did not cover that particular arrow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n First, because both parties agreed that the Court of Qu\u00e9bec had jurisdiction. No one asked for a transfer: the judge raised the issue on his own initiative and ruled otherwise. Subject-matter jurisdiction \u2014 which determines which court may hear which matter \u2014 is not negotiable between litigants. Parties cannot confer on a court a power the law does not give it, even by mutual consent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second, because the price is steep. Two days of hearing, written pleadings, a deliberation \u2014 and in the end, not a single substantive question resolved. Costs will follow the outcome of the proceeding before the Superior Court. Nobody won: Mr. Rimane was not released from his debt, and the syndicate did not obtain the sale of the fraction. The file simply changed addresses \u2014 both parties having in fact asked for the transfer should the Court reach that conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third, because the judge shows an intellectual honesty worth highlighting. He sets out the opposing argument himself: one could contend that article 34 C.C.P. merely expresses the Superior Court’s inherent supervisory power rather than conferring exclusive jurisdiction. He rejects that reading on the basis that the legislature does not speak in vain, but the question is not closed: a Small Claims Division decision had already analyzed the legality of a syndicate’s decision-making process without jurisdiction ever being raised. In our view, practice is therefore not perfectly uniform, and an appellate court could one day temper this reasoning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This decision is a reminder of a truth courts never tire of repeating: in law, the door you walk through matters as much as the argument you carry. An excellent point argued before the wrong court is worth very little \u2014 and it can cost a great deal. In small co-ownerships, where the line between neighbourly relations and governance is thin, the habit of checking the forum before opening hostilities is worth its weight in gold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The same caution applies more broadly in real estate law: asking the right questions before signing, as our column on the seller’s duty to disclose<\/a> illustrates, always costs less than litigating afterwards. Whether you sit on a board facing unpaid condo fees or you are a co-owner convinced that the decisions taken against you are unlawful, the first question to settle is the same: before which court? Our civil litigation<\/a> team can help you answer it before the bill doubles.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Facts: Two Fractions, One Board of Directors, a Dispute That Escalates<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Heart of the Defence: No Quorum<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Why the Court of Qu\u00e9bec Stepped Back<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Articles 1086.2 and 1103 C.C.Q.: A Formidable Shield, but Not Airtight<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Why This Case Is Worth Noting<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Unpaid Condo Fees: Key Takeaways for Syndicates<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Unpaid Condo Fees: Key Takeaways for Co-Owners<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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In Closing: The Door You Walk Through Matters as Much as the Argument<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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